The Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA) releases card fraud statistics every six months for the preceding 12m period. For years, Lockstep has been monitoring these figures, plotting the trend data and analysing what the industry is and is not doing about it. A few weeks ago, statistics for calendar year 2014 came out.
As we reported last time, despite APCA’s optimistic boosting of 3D Secure and education measures for many years, Card Not Present (CNP) online fraud was not falling as hoped. And what we see now in the latest numbers is the second biggest jump in CNP fraud ever! CY 2014 online card fraud losses were very nearly AU$300M, up 42% in 12 months.
Again, APCA steadfastly rationalises in its press release (PDF) that high losses simply reflect the popularity of online shopping. That’s cold comfort to the card holders and merchants who are affected.
APCA has a love-ignore relationship with 3D Secure. This is one of the years when 3D Secure goes unmentioned. Instead the APCA presser talks up tokenization, I think for the first time. Yet the payments industry has had tokenization for about a decade. It’s just another band-aid over the one fundamental crack in the payment card system: nothing stops stolen card numbers being replayed.
A proper fix to replay attack is easily within reach, which would re-use the same cryptography that solves skimming and carding, and would restore a seamless payment experience for card holders. See my 2012 paper Calling for a Uniform Approach to Card Fraud Offline and On” (PDF).
Abstract
The credit card payments system is a paragon of standardisation. No other industry has such a strong history of driving and adopting uniform technologies, infrastructure and business processes. No matter where you keep a bank account, you can use a globally branded credit card to go shopping in almost every corner of the world. The universal Four Party settlement model, and a long-standing card standard that works the same with ATMs and merchant terminals everywhere underpin seamless convenience. So with this determination to facilitate trustworthy and supremely convenient spending in every corner of the earth, it’s astonishing that the industry is still yet to standardise Internet payments. We settled on the EMV standard for in-store transactions, but online we use a wide range of confusing and largely ineffective security measures. As a result, Card Not Present (CNP) fraud is growing unchecked.
This article argues that all card payments should be properly secured using standardised hardware. In particular, CNP transactions should use the very same EMV chip and cryptography as do card present payments.
With all the innovation in payments leveraging cryptographic Secure Elements in mobile phones – the exemplar being Apple Pay for Card Present business – it beggars belief that we have yet to modernise CNP payments for web and mobile shopping.