A repeated refrain of cynics and “infomopolists” alike is that privacy is dead. People are supposed to know that anything on the Internet is up for grabs. In some circles this thinking turns into digital apartheid; some say if you’re so precious about your privacy, just stay offline.
But socialising and privacy are hardly mutually exclusive; we don’t walk around in public with our names tattooed on our foreheads. Why can’t we participate in online social networks in a measured, controlled way without submitting to the operators’ rampant X-ray vision? There is nothing inevitable about trading off privacy for conviviality.
The privacy dangers in Facebook and the like run much deeper than the self-harm done by some peoples’ overly enthusiastic sharing. Promiscuity is actually not the worst problem, neither is the notorious difficulty of navigating complex and ever changing privacy settings.
The advent of facial recognition presents far more serious and subtle privacy challenges.
Facebook has invested heavily in face recognition technology, and not just for fun. Facebook uses it in effect to crowd-source the identification and surveillance of its members. With facial recognition, Facebook is building up detailed pictures of what people do, when, where and with whom.
You can be tagged without consent in a photo taken and uploaded by a total stranger.
The majority of photos uploaded to personal albums over the years were not intended for anything other than private viewing.
Under the privacy law of Australia and data protection regulations in dozens of other jurisdictions, what matters is whether data is personally identifiable. The Commonwealth Privacy Act 1988 (as amended in 2014) defines “Personal Information” as: “information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable”.
Whenever Facebook attaches a member’s name to a photo, they are converting hitherto anonymous data into Personal Information, and in so doing, they become subject to privacy law. Automated facial recognition represents an indirect collection of Personal Information. However too many people still underestimate the privacy implications; some technologists naively claim that faces are “public” and that people can have no expectation of privacy in their facial images, ignoring that information privacy as explained is about the identifiability and identification of data; the words “public” and “private” don’t even figure in the Privacy Act!
If a government was stealing into our photo albums, labeling people and profiling them, there would be riots. It's high time that private sector surveillance - for profit - is seen for what it is, and stopped.
Ed Snowden was interviewed today as part of the New Yorker festival. This TechCruch report says Snowden "was asked a couple of variants on the question of what we can do to protect our privacy. His first answer called for a reform of government policies." He went on to add some remarks about Google, Facebook and encryption and that's what the report chose to focus on. The TechCrunch headline: "Snowden's Privacy Tips".
Mainstream and even technology media reportage does Snowden a terrible disservice and takes the pressure off from government policy.
I've listened to the New Yorker online interview. After being asked by a listener what they should do about privacy, Snowden gave a careful, nuanced, and comprehensive answer over five minutes. His very first line was this is an incredibly complex topic and he did well to stick to plain language throughout. He canvassed a great many issues including: the need for policy reform, the 'Nothing to Hide' argument, the inversion of civil rights when governments ask us to justify the right to be left alone, the collusion of companies and governments, the poor state of product security and usability, the chilling effect on industry of government intervention in security, metadata, and the radicalisation of computer scientists today being comparable with physicists in the Cold War.
Only after all that, and a follow up question about 'ordinary people', did Snowden say 'don't use Dropbox'.
Consistently, when Snowden is asked what to do about privacy, his answers are primarily about politics not technology. When pressed, he dispenses the odd advice about using Tor and disk encryption, but Snowden's chief concerns (as I have discussed in depth previously) are around accountability, government transparency, better cryptology research, better security product quality, and so on. He is no hacker.
I am simply dismayed how Snowden's sophisticated analyses are dumbed down to security tips. He has never been a "cyber Agony Aunt". The proper response to NSA overreach has to be agitation for regime change, not do-it-yourself cryptography. That is Snowden's message.
Tonight, Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s Four Corners program aired a terrific special, "Privacy Lost" written and produced by Martin Smith from the US public broadcaster PBS’s Frontline program.
Here we have a compelling demonstration of the importance and primacy of Collection Limitation for protecting our privacy.
UPDATE: The program we saw in Australia turns out to be a condensed version of PBS's two part The United States of Secrets from May 2014.
About the program
Martin Smith summarises brilliantly what we know about the NSA’s secret surveillance programs, thanks to the revelations of Ed Snowden, the Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald and the Washington Post’s Barton Gellman; he holds many additional interviews with Julia Angwin (author of “Dragnet Nation”), Chris Hoofnagle (UC Berkeley), Steven Levy (Wired), Christopher Soghoian (ACLU) and Tim Wu (“The Master Switch”), to name a few. Even if you’re thoroughly familiar with the Snowden story, I highly recommend “Privacy Lost” or the original "United States of Secrets" (which unlike the Four Corners edition can be streamed online).
The program is a ripping re-telling of Snowden’s expose, against the backdrop of George W. Bush’s PATRIOT Act and the mounting suspicions through the noughties of NSA over-reach. There are freshly told accounts of the intrigues, of secret optic fibre splitters installed very early on in AT&T’s facilities, scandals over National Security Letters, and the very rare case of the web hosting company Calyx who challenged their constitutionality (and yet today, with the letter withdrawn, remains unable to tell us what the FBI was seeking). The real theme of Smith’s take on surveillance then emerges, when he looks at the rise of data-driven businesses -- first with search, then advertising, and most recently social networking -- and the “data wars” between Google, Facebook and Microsoft.
In my view, the interplay between government surveillance and digital businesses is the most important part of the Snowden epic, and it receives the proper emphasis here. The depth and breadth of surveillance conducted by the private sector, and the insights revealed about what people might be up to creates irresistible opportunities for the intelligence agencies. Hoofnagle tells us how the FBI loves Facebook. And we see the discovery of how the NSA exploits the tracking that’s done by the ad companies, most notably Google’s “PREF” cookie.
One of the peak moments in “Privacy Lost” comes when Gellman and his specialist colleague Ashkan Soltani present their evidence about the PREF cookie to Google – offering an opportunity for the company to comment before the story is to break in the Washington Post. The article ran on December 13, 2013; we're told it was then the true depth of the privacy problem was revealed.
My point of view
Smith takes as a given that excessive intrusion into private affairs is wrong, without getting into the technical aspects of privacy (such as frameworks for data protection, and various Privacy Principles). Neither does he unpack the actual privacy harms. And that’s fine -- a TV program is not the right place to canvass such technical arguments.
When Gellman and Soltani reveal that the NSA is using Google’s tracking cookie, the government gets joined irrefutably to the private sector in a mass surveillance apparatus. And yet I am not sure the harm is dramatically worse when the government knows what Facebook and Google already know.
Privacy harms are tricky to work out. Yet obviously no harm can come from abusing Personal Information if that information is not collected in the first place! I take away from “Privacy Lost” a clear impression of the risks created by the data wars. We are imperiled by the voracious appetite of digital businesses that hang on indefinitely to masses of data about us, while they figure out ever cleverer ways to make money out of it. This is why Collection Limitation is the first and foremost privacy protection. If a business or government doesn't have a sound and transparent reason for having Personal Information about us, then they should not have it. It’s as simple as that.
Martin Smith has highlighted the symbiosis between government and private sector surveillance. The data wars not only made dozens of billionaires but they did much of the heavy lifting for the NSA. And this situation is about to get radically more fraught. On the brink of the Internet of Things, we need to question if we want to keep drowning in data.
The European Court of Justice recently ruled on the so-called "Right to be Forgotten" granting members of the public limited rights to request that search engines like Google suppress links to Personal Information under some circumstances. The decision has been roundly criticised by technologists and by American libertarians -- acting out the now familiar ritualised privacy arguments around human rights, freedom of speech, free market forces and freedom to innovate (and hence the bad pun in the title of this article). Surprisingly even some privacy advocates like Jules Polonetsky (quoted in The New Yorker) has a problem with the ECJ judgement because he seems to think it's extremist.
Of the various objections, the one I want to answer here is that search engines should not have to censor "facts" retrieved from the "public domain".
On September 30, I am participating in a live panel discussion of the Right To Be Forgotten, hosted by the IEEE; you can register here and download a video recording of the session later.
Update: recording now available here.
In an address on August 18, the European Union's Justice Commissioner Martine Reicherts made the following points about the Right to be Forgotten (RTBF):
- "[The European Court of Justice] said that individuals have the right to ask companies operating search engines to remove links with personal information about them -- under certain conditions. This applies when information is inaccurate, for example, or inadequate, irrelevant, outdated or excessive for the purposes of data processing. The Court explicitly ruled that the right to be forgotten is not absolute, but that it will always need to be balanced against other fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of the media -- which, by the way, are not absolute rights either".
In the current (September 29, 2014) issue of New Yorker, senior legal analyst Jeffrey Toobin looks at RTBF in the article "The Solace of Oblivion". It's a balanced review of a complex issue, which acknowledges the transatlantic polarization of privacy rights and freedom of speech.
Toobin interviewed Kent Walker, Google's general counsel. Walker said Google likes to think of itself as a "card catalogue": "We don't create the information. We make it accessible. A decision like [the ECJ's], which makes us decide what goes inside the card catalogue, forces us into a role we don't want."
But there's a great deal more to search than Walker lets on.
Google certainly does create fresh Personal Information, and in stupendous quantities. Their search engine is the bedrock of a hundred billion dollar business, founded on a mission to "organize the world's information". Google search is an incredible machine, the result of one of the world's biggest ever and ongoing software R&D projects. Few of us now can imagine life without Internet search and instant access to limitless information that would otherwise be utterly invisible. Search really is magic – just as Arthur C. Clarke said any sufficiently advanced technology would be.
On its face therefore, no search result is a passive reproduction of data from a "public domain". Google makes the public domain public.
But while search is free, it is hyper profitable, for the whole point of it is to underpin a gigantic advertising business. The search engine might not create the raw facts and figures in response to our queries, but it covertly creates and collects symbiotic metadata, complicating the picture. Google monitors our search histories, interests, reactions and habits, as well as details of the devices we're using, when and where and even how we are using them, all in order to divine our deep predilections. These insights are then provided in various ways to Google's paying customers (advertisers) and are also fed back into the search engine, to continuously tune it. The things we see courtesy of Google are shaped not only by their page ranking metrics but also by the company's knowledge of our preferences (which it forms by watching us across the whole portfolio of search, Gmail, maps, YouTube, and the Google+ social network). When we search for something, Google tries to predict what we really want to know.
In the modern vernacular, Google hacks the public domain.
The collection and monetization of personal metadata is inextricably linked to the machinery of search. The information Google serves up to us is shaped and transformed to such an extent, in the service of Google's business objectives, that it should be regarded as synthetic and therefore the responsibility of the company. Their search algorithms are famously secret, putting them beyond peer review; nevertheless, there is a whole body of academic work now on the subtle and untoward influences that Google exerts as it filters and shapes the version of reality it thinks we need to see.
Some objections to the RTBF ruling see it as censorship, or meddling with the "truth". But what exactly is the state of the truth that Google purportedly serves up? Search results are influenced by many arbitrary factors of Google's choosing; we don't know what those factors are, but they are dictated by Google's business interests. So in principle, why is an individual's interests in having some influence over search results any less worthy than Google's? The "right to be forgotten" is an unfortunate misnomer: it is really more of a 'limited right to have search results filtered differently'.
If Google's machinery reveals Personal Information that was hitherto impossible to find, then why shouldn't it at least participate in protecting the interests of the people affected? I don't deny that modern technology and hyper-connectivity creates new challenges for the law, and that traditional notions of privacy may be shifting. But it's not a step-change, and in the meantime, we need to tread carefully. There are as many unintended consequences and problems in the new technology as there are in the established laws. The powerful owners of benefactors of these technologies should accept some responsibility for the privacy impacts. With its talents and resources, Google could rise to the challenge of better managing privacy, instead of pleading that it's not their problem.
A Social Media Week Sydney event #SMWSydney
Law Lounge, Sydney University Law School
New Law School Building
Eastern Ave, Camperdown
Fri, Sep 26 - 10:00 AM - 11:30 AM
How can you navigate privacy fact and fiction, without the geeks and lawyers boring each other to death?
It's often said that technology has outpaced privacy law. Many digital businesses seem empowered by this brash belief. And so they proceed with apparent impunity to collect and monetise as much Personal Information as they can get their hands on.
But it's a myth!
Some of the biggest corporations in the world, including Google and Facebook, have been forcefully brought to book by privacy regulations. So, we have to ask ourselves:
- what does privacy law really mean for social media in Australia?
- is privacy "good for business"?
- is privacy "not a technology issue"?
- how can digital businesses navigate fact & fiction, without their geeks and lawyers boring each other to death?
In this Social Media Week Master Class I will:
- unpack what's "creepy" about certain online practices
- show how to rate data privacy issues objectively
- analyse classic misadventures with geolocation, facial recognition, and predicting when shoppers are pregnant
- critique photo tagging and crowd-sourced surveillance
- explain why Snapchat is worth more than three billion dollars
- analyse the regulatory implications of Big Data, Biometrics, Wearables and The Internet of Things.
We couldn't have timed this Master Class better, coming two weeks after the announcement of the Apple Watch, which will figure prominently in the class!
So please come along, for a fun and in-depth a look at social media, digital technology, the law, and decency.
About the presenter
Steve Wilson is a technologist, who stumbled into privacy 12 years ago. He rejected those well meaning slogans (like "Privacy Is Good For Business!") and instead dug into the relationships between information technology and information privacy. Now he researches and develops design patterns to help sort out privacy, alongside all the other competing requirements of security, cost, usability and revenue. His latest publications include:
- "Big Privacy: The new standard for Big Data Privacy" from Constellation Research, and
- "The collision between Big Data and privacy law" due out in October in the Australian Journal of Telecommunications and the Digital Economy.
Have you heard the news? "Privacy is dead!"
The message is urgent. It's often shouted in prominent headlines, with an implied challenge. The new masters of the digital universe urge the masses: C'mon, get with the program! Innovate! Don't be so precious! Don't you grok that Information Wants To Be Free? Old fashioned privacy is holding us back!
The stark choice posited between privacy and digital liberation is rarely examined with much intellectual rigor. Often, "privacy is dead" is just a tired fatalistic response to the latest breach or eye-popping digital development, like facial recognition, or a smartphone's location monitoring. In fact, those who earnestly assert that privacy is over are almost always trying to sell us something, be it sneakers, or a political ideology, or a wanton digital business model.
Is it really too late for privacy? Is the "genie out of the bottle"? Even if we accepted the ridiculous premise that privacy is at odds with progress, no it's not too late, for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the pessimism (or barely disguised commercial opportunism) generally confuses secrecy for privacy. And secondly, frankly, we aint seen nothin yet!
Technology certainly has laid us bare. Behavioral modeling, facial recognition, Big Data mining, natural language processing and so on have given corporations X-Ray vision into our digital lives. While exhibitionism has been cultivated and normalised by the informopolists, even the most guarded social network users may be defiled by data prospectors who, without consent, upload their contact lists, pore over their photo albums, and mine their shopping histories.
So yes, a great deal about us has leaked out into what some see as an infinitely extended neo-public domain. And yet we can be public and retain our privacy at the same time. Just as we have for centuries of civilised life.
It's true that privacy is a slippery concept. The leading privacy scholar Daniel Solove once observed that "Privacy is a concept in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means."
Some people seem defeated by privacy's definitional difficulties, yet information privacy is simply framed, and corresponding data protection laws are elegant and readily understood.
Information privacy is basically a state where those who know us are restrained in they do with the knowledge they have about us. Privacy is about respect, and protecting individuals against exploitation. It is not about secrecy or even anonymity. There are few cases where ordinary people really want to be anonymous. We actually want businesses to know - within limits - who we are, where we are, what we've done and what we like ... but we want them to respect what they know, to not share it with others, and to not take advantage of it in unexpected ways. Privacy means that organisations behave as though it's a privilege to know us. Privacy can involve businesses and governments giving up a little bit of power.
Many have come to see privacy as literally a battleground. The grassroots Cryptoparty movement came together around the heady belief that privacy means hiding from the establishment. Cryptoparties teach participants how to use Tor and PGP, and they spread a message of resistance. They take inspiration from the Arab Spring where encryption has of course been vital for the security of protestors and organisers. One Cryptoparty I attended in Sydney opened with tributes from Anonymous, and a number of recorded talks by activists who ranged across a spectrum of political issues like censorship, copyright, national security and Occupy.
I appreciate where they're coming from, for the establishment has always overplayed its security hand, and run roughshod over privacy. Even traditionally moderate Western countries have governments charging like china shop bulls into web filtering and ISP data retention, all in the name of a poorly characterised terrorist threat. When governments show little sympathy for netizenship, and absolutely no understanding of how the web works, it's unsurprising that sections of society take up digital arms in response.
Yet going underground with encryption is a limited privacy stratagem, because do-it-yourself encryption is incompatible with the majority of our digital dealings. The most nefarious and least controlled privacy offences are committed not by government but by Internet companies, large and small. To engage fairly and squarely with businesses, consumers need privacy protections, comparable to the safeguards against unscrupulous merchants we enjoy, uncontroversially, in traditional commerce. There should be reasonable limitations on how our Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is used by all the services we deal with. We need department stores to refrain from extracting health information from our shopping habits, merchants to not use our credit card numbers as customer reference numbers, shopping malls to not track patrons by their mobile phones, and online social networks to not x-ray our photo albums by biometric face recognition.
Encrypting everything we do would only put it beyond reach of the companies we obviously want to deal with. Look for instance at how the cryptoparties are organised. Some cryptoparties manage their bookings via the US event organiser Eventbrite to which attendants have to send a few personal details. So ironically, when registering for a cryptoparty, you can not use encryption!
The central issue is this: going out in public does not neutralise privacy. It never did in the physical world and it shouldn't be the case in cyberspace either. Modern society has long rested on balanced consumer protection regulations to curb the occasional excesses of business and government. Therefore we ought not to respond to online privacy invasions as if the digital economy is a new Wild West. We should not have to hide away if privacy is agreed to mean respecting the PII of customers, users and citizens, and restraining what data custodians do with that precious resource.
We're still in the early days of the social web, and the information innovation has really only just begun. There is incredible value to be extracted from mining the underground rivers of data coursing unseen through cyberspace, and refining that raw material into Personal Information.
Look at what the data prospectors and processors have managed to do already.
It's difficult to overstate the value of facial recognition to businesses like Facebook when they have just one asset: knowledge about their members and users. Combined with image analysis and content addressable graphical memory, facial recognition lets social media companies work out what we're doing, when, where and with whom. I call it piracy. Billions of everyday images have been uploaded over many years by users for ostensiby personal purposes, without any clue that technology would energe to convert those pictures into a commercial resource.
Third party services like Facedeals are starting to emerge, using Facebook's photo resources for commercial facial recognition in public. And the most recent facial recognition entrepreneurs like Name Tag App boast of scraping images from any "public" photo databases they can find. But as we shall see below, in many parts of the world there are restrictions on leveraging public-facing databases, because there is a legal difference between anonymous data and identified information.
- Some of the richest stores of raw customer data are aggregated in retailer databases. The UK department store Tesco for example is
said to hold more data about British citizens than the government does. For years of course data analysts have combed through shopping history for marketing insights, but their predictive powers are growing rapidly. An infamous example is Target's covert development of methods to identify customers who are pregnant based on their buying habits. Some Big Data practitioners seem so enamoured with their ability to extract secrets from apparently mundane data, they overlook that PII collected indirectly by algorithm is subject to privacy law just as if it was collected directly by questionnaire. Retailers need to remember this as they prepare to exploit their massive loyalty databases into new financial services ventures.
- And looking ahead, Google Glass in the privacy stakes will probably surpass both Siri and facial recognition. If actions speak louder than words, imagine the value to Google of seeing through Glass exactly what we do in real time. Digital companies wanting to know our minds won't need us to expressly "like" anything anymore; they'll be able to tell our preferences from our unexpurgated behaviours.
The surprising power of data protection regulations
There's a widespread belief that technology has outstripped privacy law, yet it turns out technology neutral data privacy law copes well with most digital developments. OECD privacy principles (enacted in over 100 countries) and the US FIPPs (Fair Information Practice Principles) require that companies be transarent about what PII they collect and why, limit the ways in which PII is used for unrelated purposes.
Privacy advocates can take heart from several cases where existing privacy regulations have proven effective against some of the informopolies' trespasses. And technologists and cynics who think privacy is hopeless should heed the lessons.
- Google StreetView cars, while they drive up and down photographing the world, also collect Wi-Fi hub coordinates for use in geo-location services. In 2010 it was discovered that the StreetView software was also collecting unencrypted Wi-Fi network traffic, some of which contained Personal Information like user names and even passwords. Privacy Commissioners in Australia, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands and elsewhere found Google was in breach of their data protection laws. Google explained that the collection was inadverrtant, apologized, and destroyed all the wireless traffic that had been gathered.
The nature of this privacy offence has confused some commentators and technologists. Some argue that Wi-Fi data in the public domain is not private, and "by definition" (so they like to say) categorically could not be private. Accordingly some believed Google was within its rights to do whatever it liked with such found data. But that reasoning fails to grasp the technicality that Data Protection laws in Europe, Australia and elsewhere do not essentially distinguish “public” from "private". In fact the word “private” doesn’t even appear in Australia’s “Privacy Act”. If data is identifiable, then privacy rights generally attach to it irrespective of how it is collected.
- Facebook photo tagging was ruled unlawful by European privacy regulators in mid 2012, on the grounds it represents a collection of PII (by the operation of the biometric matching algorithm) without consent. By late 2012 Facebook was forced to shut down facial recognition and tag suggestions in the EU. This was quite a show of force over one of the most powerful companies of the digital age. More recently Facebook has started to re-introduce photo tagging, prompting the German privacy regulator to reaffirm that this use of biometrics is counter to their privacy laws.
It's never too late
So, is it really too late for privacy? Outside the United States at least, established privacy doctrine and consumer protections have taken technocrats by surprise. They have found, perhaps counter intuitively, that they are not as free as they thought to exploit all personal data that comes their way.
Privacy is not threatened so much by technology as it is by sloppy thinking and, I'm afraid, by wishful thinking on the part of some vested interests. Privacy and anonymity, on close reflection, are not the same thing, and we shouldn't want them to be! It's clearly important to be known by others in a civilised society, and it's equally important that those who do know us, are reasonably restrained in how they use that knowledge.
It's long been said that if you're getting something for free online, then you're not the customer, you're the product. It's a reference to the one-sided bargain for personal information that powers so many social businesses - the way that "infomopolies" as I call them exploit the knowledge they accumulate about us.
Now it's been revealed that we're even lower than product: we're lab rats.
Facebook data scientist Adam Kramer, with collaborators from UCSF and Cornell, this week reported on a study in which they tested how Facebook users respond psychologically to alternatively positive and negative posts. Their experimental technique is at once ingenious and shocking. They took the real life posts of nearly 700,000 Facebook members, and manipulated them, turning them slightly up- or down-beat. And then Kramer at al measured the emotional tone in how people reading those posts reacted in their own feeds. See Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social networks, Adam Kramer,Jamie Guillory & Jeffrey Hancock, in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, v111.24, 17 June 2014.
The resulting scandal has been well-reported by many, including Kashmir Hill in Forbes, whose blog post nicely covers how the affair has unfolded, and includes a response by Adam Kramer himself.
Plenty has been written already about the dodgy (or non-existent) ethics approval, and the entirely contemptible claim that users gave "informed consent" to have their data "used" for research in this way. I draw attention to the fact that consent forms in properly constituted human research experiments are famously thick. They go to great pains to explain what's going on, the possible side effects and potential adverse consequences. The aim of a consent form is to leave the experimental subject in no doubt whatsoever as to what they're signing up for. Contrast this with the Facebook Experiment where they claim informed consent was represented by a fragment of one sentence buried in thousands of words of the data usage agreement. And Kash Hill even proved that the agreement was modified after the experiment started! These are not the actions of researchers with any genuine interest in informed consent.
I was also struck by Adam Kramer's unvarnished description of their motives. His response to the furore (provided by Hill in her blog) is, as she puts it, tone deaf. Kramer makes no attempt whatsoever at a serious scientific justification for this experiment:
- "The reason we did this research is because we care about the emotional impact of Facebook and the people that use our product ... [We] were concerned that exposure to friends’ negativity might lead people to avoid visiting Facebook.
That is, this large scale psychological experiment was simply for product development.
Some apologists for Facebook countered that social network feeds are manipulated all the time, notably by advertisers, to produce emotional responses.
Now that's interesting, because for their A-B experiment, Kramer and his colleagues took great pains to make sure the subjects were unaware of the manipulation. After all, the results would be meaningless if people knew what they were reading had been emotionally fiddled with.
In contrast, the ad industry has always insisted that today's digital consumers are super savvy, and they know the difference between advertising and real-life. Yet the foundation of the Facebook experiment is that users are unaware of how their online experience is being manipulated. The ad industry's illogical propaganda [advertising is just harmless fun, consumers can spot the ads, they're not really affected by ads all that much ... Hey, with a minute] has only been further exposed by the Facebook Experiment.
Advertising companies and Social Networks are increasingly expert at covertly manipulating perceptions, and now they have the data, collected dishonestly, to prove it.
We live in an age where billionaires are self-made on the back of the most intangible of assets – the information they have amassed about us. That information used to be volunteered in forms and questionnaires and contracts but increasingly personal information is being observed and inferred.
The modern world is awash with data. It’s a new and infinitely re-usable raw material. Most of the raw data about us is an invisible by-product of our mundane digital lives, left behind by the gigabyte by ordinary people who do not perceive it let alone understand it.
Many Big Data and digital businesses proceed on the basis that all this raw data is up for grabs. There is a particular widespread assumption that data in the "public domain" is free-for-all, and if you’re clever enough to grab it, then you’re entitled to extract whatever you can from it.
In the webinar, I'll try to show how some of these assumptions are naive. The public is increasingly alarmed about Big Data and averse to unbridled data mining. Excessive data mining isn't just subjectively 'creepy'; it can be objectively unlawful in many parts of the world. Conventional data protection laws turn out to be surprisingly powerful in in the face of Big Data. Data miners ignore international privacy laws at their peril!
Today there are all sorts of initiatives trying to forge a new technology-privacy synthesis. They go by names like "Privacy Engineering" and "Privacy by Design". These are well meaning efforts but they can be a bit stilted. They typically overlook the strengths of conventional privacy law, and they can miss an opportunity to engage the engineering mind.
It’s not politically correct but I believe we must admit that privacy is full of contradictions and competing interests. We need to be more mature about privacy. Just as there is no such thing as perfect security, there can never be perfect privacy either. And is where the professional engineering mindset should be brought in, to help deal with conflicting requirements.
If we’re serious about Privacy by Design and Privacy Engineering then we need to acknowledge the tensions. That’s some of the thinking behind Constellation's new Big Privacy compact. To balance privacy and Big Data, we need to hold a conversation with users that respects the stresses and strains, and involves them in working through the new privacy deal.
The webinar will cover these highlights of the Big Privacy pact:
- Respect and Restraint
- Super transparency
- And a fair deal for Personal Information.
Have a disruptive technology implementation story? Get recognised for your leadership. Apply for the 2014 SuperNova Awards for leaders in disruptive technology.
The latest Snowden revelations include the NSA's special programs for extracting photos and identifying from the Internet. Amongst other things the NSA uses their vast information resources to correlate location cues in photos -- buildings, streets and so on -- with satellite data, to work out where people are. They even search especially for passport photos, because these are better fodder for facial recognition algorithms. The audacity of these government surveillance activities continues to surprise us, and their secrecy is abhorrent.
Yet an ever greater scale of private sector surveillance has been going on for years in social media. With great pride, Facebook recently revealed its R&D in facial recognition. They showcased the brazenly named "DeepFace" biometric algorithm, which is claimed to be 97% accurate in recognising faces from regular images. Facebook has made a swaggering big investment in biometrics.
Data mining needs raw material, there's lots of it out there, and Facebook has been supremely clever at attracting it. It's been suggested that 20% of all photos now taken end up in Facebook. Even three years ago, Facebook held 10,000 times as many photographs as the Library of Congress:
And Facebook will spend big buying other photo lodes. Last year they tried to buy Snapchat for the spectacular sum of three billion dollars. The figure had pundits reeling. How could a start-up company with 30 people be worth so much? All the usual dot com comparisons were made; the offer seemed a flight of fancy.
But no, the offer was a rational consideration for the precious raw material that lies buried in photo data.
Snapchat generates at least 100 million new images every day. Three billion dollars was, pardon me, a snap. I figure that at a ballpark internal rate of return of 10%, a $3B investment is equivalent to $300M p.a. so even if the Snapchat volume stopped growing, Facebook would have been paying one cent for every new snap, in perpetuity.
These days, we have learned from Snowden and the NSA that communications metadata is just as valuable as the content of our emails and phone calls. So remember that it's the same with photos. Each digital photo comes from a device that embeds within the image metadata usually including the time and place of when the picture was taken. And of course each Instagram or Snapchat is a social post, sent by an account holder with a history and rich context in which the image yields intimate real time information about what they're doing, when and where.
- When you access or use our Services, we automatically collect information about you, including:
- Usage Information: When you send or receive messages via our Services, we collect information about these messages, including the time, date, sender and recipient of the Snap. We also collect information about the number of messages sent and received between you and your friends and which friends you exchange messages with most frequently.
- Log Information: We log information about your use of our websites, including your browser type and language, access times, pages viewed, your IP address and the website you visited before navigating to our websites.
- Device Information: We may collect information about the computer or device you use to access our Services, including the hardware model, operating system and version, MAC address, unique device identifier, phone number, International Mobile Equipment Identity ("IMEI") and mobile network information. In addition, the Services may access your device's native phone book and image storage applications, with your consent, to facilitate your use of certain features of the Services.
Snapchat goes on to declare it may use any of this information to "personalize and improve the Services and provide advertisements, content or features that match user profiles or interests" and it reserves the right to share any information with "vendors, consultants and other service providers who need access to such information to carry out work on our behalf".
So back to the data mining: nothing stops Snapchat -- or a new parent company -- running biometric facial recognition over the snaps as they pass through the servers, to extract additional "profile" information. And there's an extra kicker that makes Snapchats extra valuable for biometric data miners. The vast majority of Snapchats are selfies. So if you extract a biometric template from a snap, you already know who it belongs to, without anyone having to tag it. Snapchat would provide a hundred million auto-calibrations every day for facial recognition algorithms! On Facebook, the privacy aware turn off photo tagging, but with Snapchats, self identification is inherent to the experience and is unlikely to be ever be disabled.
As I've discussed before, the morbid thrill of Snowden's spying revelations has tended to overshadow his sober observations that when surveillance by the state is probably inevitable, we need to be discussing accountability.
While we're all ventilating about the NSA, it's time we also attended to private sector spying and properly debated the restraints that may be appropriate on corporate exploitation of social data.
Personally I'm much more worried that an infomopoly has all my selfies.
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My Constellation Research colleague Alan Lepofsky as been working on new ways to characterise users in cyberspace. Frustrated with the oversimplified cliche of the "Digital Millennials", Alan has developed a fresh framework for categorizing users according to their comfort with technology and their actual knowledge of it. See his new research report "Segmenting Audiences by Digital Proficiency".
This sort of schema could help frame the answers to some vital open questions. In today's maelstrom of idealism and hyperbole, we're struggling to predict how things are going to turn out, and to build appropriate policies and management structures. We are still guessing how the digital revolution is really going to change the human condition? We're not yet rigorously measuring the sorts of true changes, if any, that the digital transformation is causing.
We hold such disparate views about cyberspace right now. When the Internet does good – for example through empowering marginalized kids at schools, fueling new entrepreneurship, or connecting disadvantaged communities – it is described as a power for good, a true "paradigm shift". But when it does bad – as when kids are bullied online or when phishing scams hook inexperienced users – then the Internet is said to be just another communications medium. Such inconsistent attitudes are with us principally because the medium is still so new. Yet we all know how important it is, and that far reaching policy decisions are being made today. So it’s good to see new conceptual frameworks for analyzing the range of ways that people engage with and utilise the Internet.
Vast fortunes are being made through online business models that purport to feed a natural hunger to be social. With its vast reach and zero friction, the digital medium might radically amplify aspects of the social drive, quite possibly beyond what nature intended. As supremely communal beings, we humans have evolved elaborate social bearings for getting on in diverse groups, and we've built social conventions that govern how we meet, collaborate, refer, partner, buy and sell, amalgamate, marry, and split. We are incredibly adept at reading body language, spotting untruths, and gaming each other for protection or for personal advantage. In cyberspace, few of the traditional cues are available to us; we literally lose our bearings online. And therefore naive Internet users fall prey to spam, fake websites and all manner of scams.
How are online users adapting to their new environment and evolving new instincts? I expect there will be interesting correlations between digital resilience and the sophistication measures in Alan’s digital proficiency framework. We might expect Digital Natives to be better equipped inherently to detect and respond to online threats, although they might be somewhat more at risk by virtue of being more active. I wonder too if the risk-taking behavior which exacerbates some online risks for adolescents would be relatively more common amongst Digital Immigrants? By the same token, the Digital Skeptics who are knowledgeable yet uncomfortable may be happy staying put in that quadrant, or only venturing out for selected cyber activities, because they’re consciously managing their digital exposure.
We certainly do need new ways like Alan's Digital Proficiency Framework to understand society’s complex "Analog to Digital" conversion. I commend it to you.