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Safeguarding the pedigree of identifiers

The problem of identity takeover

The root cause of much identity theft and fraud today is the sad fact that customer reference numbers and personal identifiers are so easy to copy. Simple numerical data like bank account numbers and health IDs can be stolen from many different sources, and replayed in bogus trans-actions.

Our personal data nowadays is leaking more or less constantly, through breached databases, websites, online forms, call centres and so on, to such an extent that customer reference numbers on their own are no longer reliable. Privacy consequentially suffers because customers are required to assert their identity through circumstantial evidence, like name and address, birth date, mother’s maiden name and other pseudo secrets. All this data in turn is liable to be stolen and used against us, leading to spiralling identity fraud.

To restore the reliability of personal identifiers, we need to know their pedigree. We need to know that a presented number is genuine, that it originated from a trusted authority, it’s been stored safely by its owner, and it’s been presented with the owner’s consent.

"Notarising" personal data in chip devices

There are ways of issuing personal data to a smart chip device that prevent those data from being stolen, copied and claimed by anyone else. One way to do so is to encapsulate and notarise personal data in a unique digital certificate issued to a chip. Today, a great many personal devices routinely embody cryptographically suitable chips for this purpose, including smart phones, SIM cards, “Secure Elements”, smartcards and many wearable computers.

Consider an individual named Smith to whom Organisation A has issued a unique customer reference number N. If N is saved in ordinary computer memory or something like a magnetic stripe card, then it has no pedigree. Once the number N is presented by the cardholder in a transaction, it looks like any other number. To better safeguard N in a chip device, it can be sealed into a digital certificate, as follows:

1. generate a fresh private-public key pair inside Smith’s chip
2. export the public key
3. create a digital certificate around the public key, with an attribute corresponding to N
4. have the certificate signed by (or on behalf of) organisation A.

Pedigree Diagram 140901

The result of coordinating these processes and technologies is a logical triangle that inextricably binds cardholder Smith to their reference number N and to a specific personally controlled device. The certificate signed by organisation A attests to Smith’s ownership of both N and a particular key unique to the device. Keys generated inside the chip are retained internally, never divulged to outsiders. It is impossible to copy the private key to another device, so the triangle cannot be cloned, reproduced or counterfeited.

Note that this technique lies at the core of the EMV "Chip-and-PIN" system where the smart payment card digitally signs cardholder and transaction data, rendering it immune to replay, before sending it to the merchant terminal. See also my 2012 paper Calling for a uniform approach to card fraud, offline and on. Now we should generalise notarised personal data and digitally signed transactions beyond Card-Present payments into as much online business as possible.

Restoring privacy and consumer control

When Smith wants to present their personal number in an electronic transaction, instead of simply copying N out of memory (at which point it would lose its pedigree), Smith’s transaction software digitally signs the transaction using the certificate containing N. With standard security software, any third party can then verify that the transaction originated from a genuine chip holding the unique key certified by A as matching the number N.

Note that N doesn’t have to be a customer number or numeric identifier; it could be any personal data, such as a biometric template or a package of medical information like an allergy alert.

The capability to manage multiple key pairs and certificates, and to sign transactions with a nominated private key, is increasingly built into smart devices today. By narrowing down what you need to know about someone to a precise customer reference number or similar personal data item, we will reduce identity theft and fraud while radically improving privacy. This sort of privacy enhancing technology is the key to a safe Internet of Things, and fortunately now is widely available.

Posted in Smartcards, Security, PKI, Payments, Identity, Fraud, Biometrics

Postcard from Monterey 3 #CISmcc

Days 3 and 4 at CIS Monterey.

Andre Durand's Keynote

The main sessions at the Cloud Identity Summit (namely days three and four overall) kicked off with keynotes from Ping Identity chief Andre Durand, New Zealand technology commentator Ben Kepes, and Ping Technical Director Mark Diodati. I'd like to concentrate on Andre's speech for it was truly fresh.

Andre has an infectious enthusiasm for identity, and is a magnificent host to boot. As I recall, his CIS keynote last year in Napa was pretty simply a dedication to the industry he loves. Not that there's anything wrong with that. But this year he went a whole lot further, with a rich deep dive into some things we take for granted: identity tokens and the multitude of security domains that bound our daily lives.

It's famously been said that "identity is the new perimeter" and Andre says that view informs all they do at Ping. It's easy I think to read that slogan to mean security priorities (and careers) are moving from firewalls to IDAM, but the meaning runs deeper. Identity is meaningless without context, and each context has an edge that defines it. Identity is largely about boundaries, and closure.

  • MyPOV and as an aside: The move to "open" identities which has powered IDAM for a over a decade is subject to natural limits that arise precisely because identities are perimeters. All identities are closed in some way. My identity as an employee means nothing beyond the business activities of my employer; my identity as an American Express Cardholder has no currency at stores that don't accept Amex; my identity as a Qantas OneWorld frequent flyer gets me nowhere at United Airlines (nor very far at American, much to my surprise). We discovered years ago that PKI works well in closed communities like government, pharmaceutical supply chains and the GSM network, but that general purpose identity certificates are hopeless. So we would do well to appreciate that "open" cross-domain identity management is actually a special case and that closed IDAM systems are the general case.

Andre reviewed the amazing zoo of hardware tokens we use from day to day. He gave scores of examples, including driver licenses of course but license plates too; house key, car key, garage opener, office key; the insignias of soldiers and law enforcement officers; airline tickets, luggage tags and boarding passes; the stamps on the arms of nightclub patrons and the increasingly sophisticated bracelets of theme park customers; and tattoos. Especially vivid was Andre's account of how his little girl on arriving at CIS during the set-up was not much concerned with all the potential playthings but was utterly rapt to get her ID badge, for it made her "official".

IMG 5493 Ping Durand CISmcc Tokens make us official

Tokens indeed have always had talismanic powers.

Then we were given a fly-on-the-wall slide show of how Andre typically starts his day. By 7:30am he has accessed half a dozen token-controlled physical security zones, from his home and garage, through the road system, the car park, the office building, the elevator, the company offices and his own corner office. And he hasn't even logged into cyberspace yet! He left unsaid whether or not all these domains might be "federated".

  • MyPOV: Isn't it curious that we never seem to beg for 'Single Sign On' of our physical keys and spaces? I suspect we know instinctively that one-key-fits-all would be ridiculously expensive to retrofit and would require fantastical cooperation between physical property controllers. We only try to federate virtual domains because the most common "keys" - passwords - suck, and because we tend to underestimate the the cost of cooperation amongst digital RPs.
IMG 5493 Ping Durand CISmcc Tokens properties

Tokens are, as Andre reminded us, on hand when you need them, easy to use, easy to revoke, and hard to steal (at least without being noticed). And they're non-promiscuous in respect of the personal information they disclose about their bearers. It's a wondrous set of properties, which we should perhaps be more conscious of in our work. And tokens can be used off-line.

  • MyPOV: The point about tokens working offline is paramount. It's a largely forgotten value. Andre's compelling take on tokens makes for a welcome contrast to the rarely questioned predominance of the cloud. Managing and resolving identity in the cloud complicates architectures, concentrates more of our personal data, and puts privacy at risk (for it's harder to unweave all the traditionally independent tracks of our lives).

In closing, Andre asked a rhetorical question which was probably forming in most attendees' minds: What is the ultimate token? His answer had a nice twist. I thought he'd say it's the mobile device. With so much value now remote, multi-factor cloud access control is crucial; the smart phone is the cloud control du jour and could easily become the paragon of tokens. But no, Andre considers that a group of IDAM standards could be the future "universal token" insofar as they beget interoperability and portability.

He said of the whole IDAM industry "together we are networking identity". That's a lovely sentiment and I would never wish to spoil Andre Durand's distinctive inclusion, but on that point technically he's wrong, for really we are networking attributes! More on that below and in my previous #CISmcc diary notes.

The identity family tree

My own CISmcc talk came at the end of Day 4. I think it was well received; the tweet stream was certainly keen and picked up the points I most wanted to make. Attendance was great, for which I should probably thank Andre Durand, because he staged the Closing Beach Party straight afterwards.

I'll post an annotated copy of my slides shortly. In brief I presented my research on the evolution of digital identity. There are plenty of examples of how identity technologies and identification processes have improved over time, with steadily stronger processes, regulations and authenticators. It's fascinating too how industries adopt authentication features from one another. Internet banking for example took the one-time password fob from late 90's technology companies, and the Australian PKI de facto proof-of-identity rules were inspired by the standard "100 point check" mandated for account origination.

Steve Wilson CIS2014 Authentication Family Tree  Bank identity evolves blog CISmcc

Clearly identity techniques shift continuously. What I want to do is systematise these shifts under a single unifying "phylogeny"; that is, a rigorously worked-out family tree. I once used the metaphor of a family tree in a training course to help people organise their thinking about authentication, but the inter-relationships between techniques was guesswork on my part. Now I'm curious if there is a real family tree that can explain the profusion of identities we have been working so long on simplifying, often to little avail.

Steve Wilson CIS2014 Authentication Family Tree (1 0) CISmcc CIS Cloud Identity

True Darwinian evolution requires there to be replicators that correspond to the heritable traits. Evolution results when the proportions of those replicators in the "gene pool" drift over generations as survival pressures in the environment filter beneficial traits. The definition of Digital Identity as a set of claims or attributes provides a starting point for a Darwinian treatment. I observe that identity attributes are like "Memes" - the inherited units of culture first proposed by biologist Richard Dawkins. In my research I am trying to define sets of available "characters" corresponding to technological, business and regulatory features of our diverse identities, and I'm experimenting with phylogenetic modelling programs to see what patterns emerge in sets of character traits shared by those identities.

Steve Wilson CIS2014 Authentication Family Tree  Memome Characters blog CISmcc

So what? A rigorous scientific model for identity evolution would have many benefits. First and foremost it would have explanatory power. I do not believe that as an industry we have a satisfactory explanation for the failure of such apparently good ideas as Information Cards. Nor for promising federation projects like the Australian banking sector's "Trust Centre" and "MAMBO" lifetime portable account number. I reckon we have been "over federating" identity; my hunch is that identities have evolved to fit particular niches in the business ecosystem to such an extent that taking a student ID for instance and using it to log on to a bank is like dropping a saltwater fish into a freshwater tank. A stronger understanding of how attributes are organically interrelated would help us better plan federated identity, and to even do "memetic engineering" of the attributes we really want to re-use between applications and contexts.

If a phylogenetic tree can be revealed, it would confirm the 'secret lives' of attributes and thereby lend more legitimacy to the Attributes Push (which coincidentally some of us first spotted at a previous CIS, in 2013). It would also provide evidence that identification risks in local environments are why identities have come to be the way they are. In turn, we could pay more respect to authentication's idiosyncrasies, instead of trying to pigeonhole them into four rigid Levels of Assurance. At Sunday's NSTIC session, CTO Paul Grassi floated the idea of getting rid of LOAs. That would be a bold move of course; it could be helped along by a new fresh focus to attributes. And of course we kept hearing throughout CIS Monterey about the FIDO Alliance with its devotion to authentication through verified device attributes, and its strategy to stay away from the abstract business of identities.

Steve Wilson CIS2014 Authentication Family Tree  FIDO blog CISmcc

Reflections on CIS 2014

I spoke with many people at CIS about what makes this event so different. There's the wonderful family program of course, and the atmosphere that creates. And there's the paradoxical collegiality. Ping has always done a marvelous job of collaborating in various standards groups, and likewise with its conference, Ping's people work hard to create a professional, non-competitive environment. There are a few notable absentees of course but all the exhibitors and speakers I spoke to - including Ping's direct competitors - endorsed CIS as a safe and important place to participate in the identity community, and to do business.

But as a researcher and analyst, the Cloud Identity Summit is where I think you can see the future. People report hearing about things for the first time at a CIS, only to find those things coming true a year or two later. It's because there are so many influencers here.

Last year one example was the Attributes Push. This year, the onus on Attributes has become entirely mainstream. For example, the NSTIC pilot partner ID.me (a start-up business focused on improving veterans' access to online discounts through improved verification of entitlements) talks proudly of their ability to convey attributes and reduce the exposure of identity. And Paul Grassi proposes much more focus on Attributes from 2015.

Another example is the "Authorization Agent" (AZA) proposed for SSO in mobile platforms, which was brand new when Paul Madsen presented it at CIS Napa in 2013. Twelve months on, AZA has broadened into the Native Apps (NAPPS) OpenID Working Group.

Then there are the things that are nearly completely normalised. Take mobile devices. They figured in just about every CISmcc presentation, but were rarely called out. Mobile is simply the way things are now.

Hardware stores

So while the mobile form factor is taken for granted, the cryptographic goodies now standard in most handsets, and increasingly embedded in smart things and wearables, got a whole lot of express attention at CISmcc. I've already made much of Andre Durand's keynote on tokens. It was the same throughout the event.

    • There was a session on hybrid Physical and Logical Access Control Systems (PACS-LACS) featuring the US Government's PIV-I smartcard standard and the major ongoing R&D on that platform sponsored by DHS.
    • Companies like SecureKey are devoted to hardware-based keys, increasingly embedded in "street IDs" like driver licenses, and are working with numerous players deep in the SIM and smartcard supply chains.
    • The FIDO Alliance is fundamentally about hardware based identity security measures, leveraging embedded key pairs to attest to the pedigree of authenticator models and the attributes that they transmit on behalf of their verified users. FIDO promises to open up the latent authentication power of many 100s of millions of devices already featuring Secure Elements of one kind or another. FIDO realises PKI the way nature intended all along.
    • The good old concept of "What You See Is What You Sign" (WYSIWYS) is making a comeback, with mobile platform players appreciating that users of smartphones need reliable cues in the UX as to the integrity of transaction data served up in their rich operating systems. Clearly some exciting R&D lies ahead.
    • In a world of formal standards, we should also acknowledge the informal standards around us - the benchmarks and conventions that represent the 'real way' to do things. Hardware based security is taken increasingly for granted. The FIDO protocols are based on key pairs that people just seem to assume (correctly) will be generated in the compliant devices during registration. And Apple with its iTouch has helped to 'train' end users that biometrics templates must never leave the safety of a controlled hardware end point. FIDO of course makes that a hard standard.

What's next?

In my view, the Cloud Identity Summit is the only not-to-be missed event on the IDAM calendar. So long may it continue. And if CIS is where you go to see the future, what's next?

    • Judging by CISmcc, I reckon we're going to see entire sessions next year devoted to Continuous Authentication, in which signals are collected from wearables and the Internet of Things at large, to gain insights into the state of the user at every important juncture.
    • With the disciplined separation of abstract identities from concrete attributes, we're going to need an Digital Identity Stack for reference. FIDO's pyramid is on the right track, but it needs some work. I'm not sure the pyramid is the right visualisation; for one thing it evokes Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs in which the pinnacle corresponds to luxuries not essentials!
    • Momentum will grow around Relationships. Kantara's new Identity Relationship Management (IRM) WG was talked about in the CISmcc corridors. I am not sure we're all using the word in the same way, but it's a great trend, for Digital Identity is only really a means to an end, and it's the relationships they support that make identities important.

So there's much to look forward to!

See you again next year (I hope) in Monterey!

Posted in Smartcards, PKI, Language, Identity, Federated Identity, Cloud

Postcard from Monterey #CISmcc

First Day Reflections from CIS Monterey.

Follow along on Twitter at #CISmcc (for the Monterey Conference Centre).

The Cloud Identity Summit really is the top event on the identity calendar. The calibre of the speakers, the relevance and currency of the material, the depth and breadth of the cohort, and the international spread are all unsurpassed. It's been great to meet old cyber-friends in "XYZ Space" at last -- like Emma Lindley from the UK and Lance Peterman. And to catch up with such talented folks like Steffen Sorensen from New Zealand once again.

A day or two before, Ian Glazer of Salesforce asked in a tweet what we were expecting to get out of CIS. And I replied that I hoped to change my mind about something. It's unnerving to have your understanding and assumptions challenged by the best in the field ... OK, sometimes it's outright embarrassing ... but that's what these events are all about. A very wise lawyer said to me once, around 1999 at the dawn of e-commerce, that he had changed his mind about authentication a few times up to that point, and that he fully expected to change his mind again and again.

I spent most of Saturday in Open Identity Foundation workshops. OIDF chair Don Thibeau enthusiastically stressed two new(ish) initiatives: Mobile Connect in conjunction with the mobile carrier trade association GSM Association @GSMA, and HIE Connect for the health sector. For the uninitiated, HIE means Health Information Exchange, namely a hub for sharing structured e-health records among hospitals, doctors, pharmacists, labs, e-health records services, allied health providers, insurers, drug & device companies, researchers and carers; for the initiated, we know there is some language somewhere in which the letters H.I.E. stand for "Not My Lifetime".

But seriously, one of the best (and pleasantly surprising) things about HIE Connect as the OIDF folks tell it, is the way its leaders unflinchingly take for granted the importance of privacy in the exchange of patient health records. Because honestly, privacy is not a given in e-health. There are champions on the new frontiers like genomics that actually say privacy may not be in the interests of the patients (or more's the point, the genomics businesses). And too many engineers in my opinion still struggle with privacy as something they can effect. So it's great -- and believe me, really not obvious -- to hear the HIE Connects folks -- including Debbie Bucci from the US Dept of Health and Human Services, and Justin Richer of Mitre and MIT -- dealing with it head-on. There is a compelling fit for the OAUTH and OIDC protocols here, with their ability to manage discrete pieces of information about users (patients) and to permission them all separately. Having said that, Don and I agree that e-health records permissioning and consent is one of the great UI/UX challenges of our time.

Justin also highlighted that the RESTful patterns emerging for fine-grained permissions management in healthcare are not confined to healthcare. Debbie added that the ability to query rare events without undoing privacy is also going to be a core defining challenge in the Internet of Things.

MyPOV: We may well see tremendous use cases for the fruits of HIE Exchange before they're adopted in healthcare!

In the afternoon, we heard from Canadian and British projects that have been working with the Open Identity Exchange (OIX) program now for a few years each.

Emma Lindley presented the work they've done in the UK Identity Assurance Program (IDAP) with social security entitlements recipients. These are not always the first types of users we think of for sophisticated IDAM functions, but in Britain, local councils see enormous efficiency dividends from speeding up the issuance of eg disabled parking permits, not to mention reducing imposters, which cost money and lead to so much resentment of the well deserved. Emma said one Attributes Exchange beta project reduced the time taken to get a 'Blue Badge' permit from 10 days to 10 minutes. She went on to describe the new "Digital Sources of Trust" initiative which promises to reconnect under-banked and under-documented sections of society with mainstream financial services. Emma told me the much-abused word "transformational" really does apply here.

MyPOV: The Digital Divide is an important issue for me, and I love to see leading edge IDAM technologies and business processes being used to do something about it -- and relatively quickly.

Then Andre Boysen of SecureKey led a discussion of the Canadian identity ecosystem, which he said has stabilised nicely around four players: Federal Government, Provincial Govt, Banks and Carriers. Lots of operations and infrastructure precedents from the payments industry have carried over.
Andre calls the smart driver license of British Columbia the convergence of "street identity and digital identity".

MyPOV: That's great news - and yet comparable jurisdictions like Australia and the USA still struggle to join governments and banks and carriers in an effective identity synthesis without creating great privacy and commercial anxieties. All three cultures are similarly allergic to identity cards, but only in Canada have they managed to supplement drivers licenses with digital identities with relatively high community acceptance. In nearly a decade, Australia has been at a standstill in its national understanding of smartcards and privacy.

For mine, the CIS Quote of the Day came from Scott Rice of the Open ID Foundation. We all know the stark problem in our industry of the under-representation of Relying Parties in the grand federated identity projects. IdPs and carriers so dominate IDAM. Scott asked us to imagine a situation where "The auto industry was driven by steel makers". Governments wouldn't put up with that for long.

Can someone give us the figures? I wonder if Identity and Access Management is already more economically ore important than cars?!

Cheers from Monterey, Day 1.

Posted in Smartcards, Security, Identity, Federated Identity, e-health, Cloud, Biometrics, Big Data

Calling for a uniform approach to card fraud, offline and on

This blog is an edited extract from an article of the same name, first published in the Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce, December 2012, vol. 17, no.3.

Abstract

The credit card payments system is a paragon of standardisation. No other industry has such a strong history of driving and adopting uniform technologies, infrastructure and business processes. No matter where you keep a bank account, you can use a globally branded credit card to go shopping in almost every corner of the world. Seamless convenience is underpinned by the universal Four Party settlement model, and a long-standing card standard that works the same with ATMs and merchant terminals everywhere.

So with this determination to facilitate trustworthy and supremely convenient spending everywhere, it’s astonishing that the industry is still yet to standardise Internet payments. Most of the world has settled on the EMV standard for in-store transactions, but online we use a wide range of confusing and largely ineffective security measures. As a result, Card Not Present (CNP) fraud is growing unchecked. This article argues that all card payments should be properly secured using standardised hardware. In particular, CNP transactions should use the very same EMV chip and cryptography as do card present payments.

Skimming and Carding

With “carding”, criminals replicate stolen customer data on blank cards and use those card copies in regular merchant terminals. “Skimming” is one way of stealing card data, by running a card through a copying device when the customer isn’t looking (but it’s actually more common for card data to be stolen in bulk from compromised merchant and processor databases).

A magnetic stripe card stores the customer’s details as a string of ones and zeroes, and presents them to a POS terminal or ATM in the clear. It’s child’s play for criminals to scan the bits and copy them to a blank card.

The industry responded to skimming and carding with EMV (aka Chip-and-PIN). EMV replaces the magnetic storage with an integrated circuit, but more importantly, it secures the data transmitted from card to terminal. EMV works by first digitally signing those ones and zeros in the chip, and then verifying the signature at the terminal. The signing uses a Private Key unique to the cardholder and held safely inside the chip where it cannot be tampered with by fraudsters. It is not feasible to replicate the digital signature without having access to the inner workings of the chip, and thus EMV cards resist carding.

Online Card Fraud

Conventional Card Not Present (CNP) transactions are vulnerable because, a lot like the old mag stripe cards, they rest on clear text cardholder data. On its own, a merchant server cannot tell the difference between the original card data and a copy, just as a terminal cannot tell an original mag stripe card from a criminal's copy.

So CNP fraud is just online carding.

Despite the simplicity of the root problem, the past decade has seen a bewildering patchwork of flimsy and expensive online payments fixes. Various One Time Passwords have come and gone, from scratchy cards to electronic key fobs. Temporary SMS codes have been popular but were recently declared unsafe by the Communications Alliance in Australia, a policy body representing the major mobile carriers.

“3D Insecure”

Meanwhile, extraordinary resources have been squandered on the novel “3D Secure” scheme (MasterCard “SecureCode” and “Verified by Visa”). 3D Secure take-up is piecemeal; it’s widely derided by merchants and customers alike. It is often blocked by browsers; and it throws up odd looking messages that can appear like a phishing attack or other malfunction. Moreover, it upsets the underlying Four Party settlements architecture, slowing transactions to a crawl and introducing untold legal complexities. Payments regulators too appear to have lost interest in 3D Secure.

So why doesn’t the card payments industry go back to its roots, preserve its global Four Party settlement architecture and standards, and tackle the real issue?

Kill two birds with one chip

We could stop most online fraud by using the same chip technologies we deployed to kill off skimming and carding.

It is technically simple to reproduce the familiar card-present user experience in a standard computer. It would just take the will of the financial services industry to make payments by smartcard standard. Computers with built-in smartcard readers have come and gone; they're commonplace in some Eastern European and Asian markets where smartcards are normal for e-health and online voting.

With dual interface and contactless smartcards, the interface options open right up. The Dell E series Latitudes have contactless card readers as standard (aimed at the US Personal ID Verification PIV market). But most mobile devices now feature NFC or “Near Field Communications”, a special purpose device-to-device networking capability, which until now has mostly been used to emulate a payment card. But NFC tablets and smartphones can switch into reader emulation mode, so as to act as a smartcard terminal. Other researchers have recently demonstrated how to read a smartcard via NFC to authenticate the cardholder to a mobile device.

As an alternative, the SIM or other "Secure Element" of most mobile devices could be used to digitally sign card transactions directly, in place of the card. That’s essentially how NFC payment apps works for Card Present transactions – but nobody has yet made the leap to use smart phone hardware security for Card Not Present.

Using a smart payment card with a computer could and should be as easy as using Paywave or Paypass.

Conclusion: Hardware security

All serious payments systems use hardware security. The classic examples include SIM cards, EMV, the Hardware Security Modules mandated by regulators in all ATMs, and the Secure Elements of NFC devices. With well designed hardware security, we gain a lasting upper hand in the criminal arms race.

The Internet and mobile channels will one day overtake the traditional physical payments medium. Indeed, commentators already like to say that the “digital economy” is simply the economy. Therefore, let us stop struggling with stopgap Internet security measures, and let us stop pretending that PCI-DSS audits will stop organised crime stealing card numbers by the million. Instead, we should kill two birds with one stone, and use chip technology to secure both card present and CNP transactions, to deliver the same high standards of usability and security in all channels.

Posted in Smartcards, Security, Payments, Fraud

FIDO Alliance goes from strength to strength

With a bunch of exciting new members joining up on the eve of the RSA Conference, the FIDO Alliance is going from strength to strength. And they've just published the first public review drafts of their core "universal authentication" protocols.

An update to my Constellation Research report on FIDO is now available. Here's a preview.

The Go-To standards alliance in protocols for modern identity management

The FIDO Alliance – for Fast IDentity Online – is a fresh, fast growing consortium of security vendors and end users working out a new suite of protocols and standards to connect authentication endpoints to services. With an unusual degree of clarity in this field, FIDO envisages simply "doing for authentication what Ethernet did for networking".

Launched in early 2013, the FIDO Alliance has already grown to nearly 100 members, amongst which are heavyweights like Google, Lenovo, MasterCard, Microsoft and PayPal as well as a couple of dozen biometrics vendors, many of the leading Identity and Access Management solutions and service providers and several global players in the smartcard supply chain.

FIDO is different. The typical hackneyed elevator pitch in Identity and Access Management promises to "fix the password crisis" – usually by changing the way business is done. Most IDAM initiatives unwittingly convert clear-cut technology problems into open-ended business transformation problems. In contrast, FIDO's mission is refreshingly clear cut: it seeks to make strong authentication interoperable between devices and servers. When users have activated FIDO-compliant endpoints, reliable fine-grained information about their client environment becomes readily discoverable by any servers, which can then make access control decisions, each according to its own security policy.

With its focus, pragmatism and critical mass, FIDO is justifiably today's go-to authentication standards effort.

In February 2014, the FIDO Alliance announced the release of its first two protocol drafts, and a clutch of new members including powerful players in financial services, the cloud and e-commerce. Constellation notes in particular the addition to the board of security leader RSA and another major payments card, Discover. And FIDO continues to strengthen its vital “Relying Party” (service provider) representation with the appearance of Aetna, Goldman Sachs, Netflix and Salesforce.com.

It's time we fixed the Authentication plumbing

In my view, the best thing about FIDO is that it is not about federated identity but instead it operates one layer down in what we call the digital identity stack. This might seem to run against the IDAM tide, but it's refreshing, and it may help the FIDO Alliance sidestep the quagmire of identity policy mapping and legal complexities. FIDO is not really about the vexed general issue of "identity" at all! Instead, it's about low level authentication protocols; that is, the plumbing.

The FIDO Alliance sets out its mission as follows:

  • Change the nature of online authentication by:
    • Developing technical specifications that define an open, scalable, interoperable set of mechanisms that reduce the reliance on passwords to authenticate users.
    • Operating industry programs to help ensure successful worldwide adoption of the Specifications.
    • Submitting mature technical Specification(s) to recognized standards development organization(s) for formal standardization.

The engineering problem underlying Federated Identity is actually pretty simple: if we want to have a choice of high-grade physical, multi-factor "keys" used to access remote services, how do we convey reliable cues to those services about the type of key being used and the individual who's said to be using it? If we can solve that problem, then service providers and Relying Parties can sort out for themselves precisely what they need to know about the users, sufficient to identify and authenticate them.

All of these leaves the 'I' in the acronym "FIDO" a little contradictory. It's such a cute name (alluding of course to the Internet dog) that it's unlikely to change. Instead, I overheard that the acronym might go the way of "KFC" where eventually it is no longer spelled out and just becomes a word in and of itself.

FIDO Alliance Board Members

  • Blackberry
  • CrucialTec (manufactures innovative user input devices for mobiles)
  • Discover Card
  • Google
  • Lenovo
  • MasterCard
  • Microsoft
  • Nok Nok Labs (a specialist authentication server software company)
  • NXP Semiconductors (a global supplier of card chips, SIMs and Secure Elements)
  • Oberthur Technologies (a multinational smartcard and mobility solutions provider)
  • PayPal
  • RSA
  • Synaptics (fingerprint biometrics)
  • Yubico (the developer of the YubiKey PKI enabled 2FA token).

FIDO Alliance Board Sponsor Level Members

  • Aetna
  • ARM
  • AGNITiO
  • Dell
  • Discretix
  • Entersekt
  • EyeLock Inc.
  • Fingerprint Cards AB
  • FingerQ
  • Goldman Sachs
  • IdentityX
  • IDEX ASA
  • Infineon
  • Kili
  • Netflix
  • Next Biometrics Group
  • Oesterreichische Staatsdruckerei GmbH
  • Ping Identity
  • SafeNet
  • Salesforce
  • SecureKey
  • Sonavation
  • STMicroelectronics
  • Wave Systems

Stay tuned for the updated Constellation Research report.

Posted in Smartcards, Security, Identity, Federated Identity, Constellation Research, Biometrics

The ROI for breaching Target

An unhappy holiday for Target customers

A week before Christmas, Target in the US revealed it had suffered a massive payment card data breach, with some 40 million customers affected. Details of the breach are still emerging. No well-informed criticism has yet to emerge of Target's security; instead most observers say that Target has very serious security, and therefore this latest attack must have been very sophisticated, or else an inside job. It appears Target was deemed PCI-DSS compliant -- which only goes to prove yet again the futility of the PCI audit regime for deterring organized criminals.

Security analyst Brian Krebs has already seen evidence of a "fire sale" on carding sites. Cardholder records are worth several dollars each, up to $44 according to Krebs for "fresh" accounts. So the Return on Investment for really big attacks like this one on Target (and before that, on Adobe, Heartland Payments Systems, TJMaxx and Sony) can approach one billion dollars.

We have to face the fact that no amount of conventional IT security can protect a digital asset worth a billion dollars. Conventional security can repel amateur attacks and prevent accidental losses, but security policies, audits and firewalls are not up to the job when a determined thief knows what they're looking for.

It's high time that we rendered payment card data immune to criminal reuse. This is not a difficult technological problem; it's been solved before in Card Present transactions around the world, and with a little will power, the payments industry could do it again for Internet payments, nullifying the black market in stolen card data.

A history of strong standardisation

The credit card payments system is a paragon of standardisation. No other industry has such a strong history of driving and adopting uniform technologies, infrastructure and business processes. No matter where you keep a bank account, you can use a globally branded credit card to go shopping in almost every corner of the planet. This seamless interoperability is created by the universal Four Party settlement model, and a long-standing plastic card standard that works the same with ATMs and merchant terminals absolutely everywhere.

So with this determination to facilitate trustworthy and supremely convenient spending in worldwide, it's astonishing that the industry is still yet to standardise Internet payments! We have for the most part settled on the EMV chip card standard for in-store transactions, but online we use a wide range of confusing, piecemeal and largely ineffective security measures. As a result, Card Not Present (CNP) fraud has boomed. I argue that all card payments -- offline and online -- should be properly secured using standardised hardware. In particular, CNP transactions should either use the very same EMV chip and cryptography as do Card Present payments, or it should exploit the capability of mobile handsets and especially Secure Elements.

CNP Fraud trends

The Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA) releases twice-yearly card fraud statistics, broken down by fraud type: skimming & carding, Card Not Present, stolen cards and so on. Lockstep Consulting monitors the APCA releases and compiles a longitudinal series. The latest Australian card fraud figures are shown below.

CNP trends pic to FY 2013


APCA like other regulators tend to varnish the rise in CNP fraud, saying it's smaller than the overall rise in e-commerce. There are several ways to interpret this contextualization. The population-wide systemic advantages of e-commerce can indeed be said to outweigh the fraud costs, yet this leaves the underlying vulnerability to payments fraud unaddressed, and ignores the qualitative problems suffered by the individual victims of fraud (as they say, history is written by the winners). It's pretty complacent to play down fraud as being small compared with the systemic benefit of shopping online; it would be like meekly attributing a high road toll to the popularity of motor cars. At some point, we have to do something about safety!

[And note very carefully that online fraud and online shopping are not in fact two sides of the same coin. Criminals obtain most of their stolen card data from offline retail and processing environments. It's a bit rude to argue CNP fraud is small as a proportion of e-commerce when some people who suffer from stolen card data might have never shopped online in their lives!]

Frankly it's a mystery why the payments industry seems so bamboozled by CNP fraud, because technically it's a very simple problem. And it's one we've already solved elsewhere. For Card Not Present fraud is simply online carding.

Skimming and Carding

In carding, criminals replicate stolen customer data on blank cards; with CNP fraud they replay stolen data on merchant servers.

A magstripe card stores the customer's details as a string of ones and zeroes, and presents them to a POS terminal or ATM in the clear. It's child's play for criminals to scan the bits and copy them to a blank card.

The payments industry responded to skimming and carding with EMV (aka Chip-and-PIN). EMV replaces the magnetic storage with an integrated circuit, but more importantly, it secures the data transmitted from card to terminal. EMV works by first digitally signing those ones and zeros in the chip, and then verifying the signature at the terminal. The signing uses a Private Key unique to the cardholder and held safely inside the chip where it cannot be tampered with by fraudsters. It is not feasible to replicate the digital signature without having access to the inner workings of the chip, and thus EMV cards resist carding.

Online card fraud

Conventional Card Not Present (CNP) transactions are vulnerable because, like the old magstripe cards themselves, they rest on cleartext cardholder data. On its own, a merchant server cannot tell the difference between the original card data and a copy, just as a terminal cannot tell an original magstripe card from a criminal's copy.

Despite the simplicity of the root problem, the past decade has seen a bewildering patchwork of flimsy and expensive online payments fixes. Various One Time Passwords have come and gone, from scratchy cards to electronic key fobs. Temporary SMS codes have been popular for two-step verification of transactions but were recently declared unfit for purpose by the Communications Alliance in Australia, a policy body representing the major mobile carriers.

Meanwhile, extraordinary resources have been squandered on the novel "3D Secure" scheme (MasterCard SecureCode and Verified by Visa). 3D Secure take-up is piecemeal; it's widely derided by merchants and customers alike. It upsets the underlying Four Party settlements architecture, slowing transactions to a crawl and introducing untold legal complexities.

A solution is at hand -- we've done it before

Why doesn't the card payments industry go back to its roots, preserve its global architecture and standards, and tackle the real issue? We could stop most online fraud by using the same chip technologies we deployed to kill off skimming.

It is technically simple to reproduce the familiar card-present user experience in a standard computer or in digital form on a smart phone. It would just take the will of the financial services industry to standardise digital signatures on payment messages sent from a card holder's device or browser to a merchant server.

And there is ample room for innovative payments modalities in online and mobile commerce settings:

  • A smart phone can hold a digital wallet of keys corresponding to the owner's cards; the keys can be invoked by a payments app, ideally inside a Secure Element in the handset, to digitally sign each payment, preventing tampering, theft and replay.

  • A tablet computer or smart phone can interface a conventional contactless payment card over the NFC (Near Field Communications) channel and use that card to sign transactions (see also the NFC interface demo by IBM Research).

  • Many laptop computers feature smartcard readers (some like the Dell e-series Latitudes even have contactless readers) which could accept conventional credit or debit cards.

  • Conclusion

    All serious payments systems use hardware security. The classic examples include SIM cards, EMV, the Hardware Security Modules mandated by regulators in all ATMs, and the Secure Elements of NFC mobile devices. With well-designed hardware security, we gain a lasting upper hand in the cybercrime arms race.

    The Internet and mobile channels will one day overtake the traditional physical payments medium. Indeed, commentators already like to say that the "digital economy" is simply the economy. Therefore, let us stop struggling with stopgap Internet security measures, and let us stop pretending that PCI-DSS audits will stop organised crime stealing card numbers by the million. Instead, we should kill two birds with one stone, and use chip technology to secure both Card Present and CNP transactions, to deliver the same high standards of usability and security in all channels.

    Until we render stolen card data useless to criminals, the Return on Investment will remain high for even very sophisticated attacks (or simply bribing insiders), and spectacular data breaches like Target's will continue.

    Posted in Smartcards, Security, Payments, Fraud

    My analysis of the FIDO Alliance

    I've written a new Constellation Research "Quark" Report on the FIDO Alliance ("Fast Identity Online"), a fresh, fast growing consortium working out protocols and standards to connect authentication endpoints to services.

    With a degree of clarity that is uncommon in Identity and Access Management (IDAM), FIDO envisages simply "doing for authentication what Ethernet did for networking".

    Not quite one year old, 2013, the FIDO Alliance has already grown to nearly 70 members, amongst which are heavyweights like Google, Lenovo, MasterCard, Microsoft and PayPal as well as a dozen biometrics vendors and several global players in the smartcard supply chain.

    STOP PRESS! Discover Card joined a few days ago at board level.

    FIDO is different. The typical hackneyed IDAM elevator pitch in promises to "fix the password crisis" but usually with unintended impacts on how business is done. Most IDAM initiatives unwittingly convert clear-cut technology problems into open-ended business transformation problems.

    In welcome contrast, FIDO’s mission is clear cut: it seeks to make strong authentication interoperable between devices and servers. When users have activated FIDO-compliant endpoints, reliable fine-grained information about the state of authentication becomes readily discoverable by any server, which can then make access control decisions according to its own security policy.

    FIDO is not about federation; it's not even about "identity"!

    With its focus, pragmatism and critical mass, FIDO is justifiably today’s go-to authentication industry standards effort.

    For more detail, please have a look at The FIDO Alliance at the Constellation Research website.

    Posted in Smartcards, Security, Identity, Biometrics

    A serious advance in mobile device authentication

    IBM Zurich researcher Diego Ortiz-Yepes recently revealed a new Two Factor Authentication technique in which the bona fides of a user of a mobile app are demonstrated via a contactless smartcard waved over the mobile device. The technique leverages NFC -- but as a communications medium, not as a payments protocol. The method appears to be compatible with a variety of smartcards, capable of carrying a key specific to the user and performing some simple cryptographic operations.

    This is actually really big.

    I hope the significance is not lost in the relentless noise of new security gadget announcements, because it's the most important new approach to authentication we've seen for a long long time. The method can easily be adopted by the NFC and smartcard ecosystems with no hardware changes. And with mobile adoption at a tipping point, we need true advances in security like this to be adopted as widely and as quickly as possible. If we ignore it, future generations will look back on the dawn of m-business as another opportunity lost.

    A golden opportunity to address an urgent problem

    Mobile represents the first greenfield computing platform in thirty years. Not since the PC have we seen a whole new hardware/software/services/solutions environment emerge.

    It's universally acknowledged that general purpose PCs and Internet Protocol for that matter were never engineered with security much in mind. The PC and the Internet were independently architected years before the advent of e-commerce, and without any real sense of the types of mission critical applications they would come to support.

    I remember visiting Silicon Valley in 1998 when I was with KPMG's pioneering PKI team, working on, amongst other things, the American Bar Association e-signature guidelines. We were meeting with visionaries, asking Will anyone ever actually shop "online"?. Nobody really knew! But at startling speed, commodity PCs and the Internet were indeed being joined up for shopping and so much more: payments, and e-health, and the most sensitive corporate communications. Yet no mainstream computer manufacturer or standards body ever re-visited their designs with these uses in mind.

    And so today, a decade and a half on (or a century in "Internet years") we have security boffins earnestly pronouncing "well you know, there is no identity layer in the Internet". No kidding! Identity theft and fraud are rife, with as yet no industry-wide coordinated response. Phishing and pharming continue at remarkable rates. "Advanced Persistent Threats" (APTs) have been industrialised, through malware exploit kits like Blackhole which even come with licensing deals and help desk support that rivals that of legitimate software companies. Even one of the world's very best security companies, RSA, fell victim to an APT attack that started with an trusted employee opening a piece of spam.

    But in the nick of time, along comes the mobile platform, with all the right attributes to make safe the next generation of digital transactions. Most mobile devices come with built-in "Secure Elements": certifiably secure, tamper-resistant chips in which critical cryptographic operations take place. Historically the SIM card (Subscriber Identification Module) has been the main Secure Element; "NFC" technology (Near Field Communications) introduces a new generation of Secure Elements, with vastly more computing power and flexibility than SIMs, including the ability to run mission critical apps entirely within the safe chip.

    The Secure Element should be a godsend. It is supported in the NFC architecture by Trusted Service Managers (TSMs) which securely transfer critical data and apps from verified participants (like banks) into the consumers' devices. Technically, the TSMs are a lot like the cell phone personalisation infrastructure that seamlessly governs SIM cards worldwide, and secures mobile billing and roaming. Admittedly, TSMs have been a bit hard to engage with; to date, they're monopolised by telcos that control access to the Secure Elements and have sought to lease memory at exorbitant rates. But if we collectively have the appetite at this time to solve cyberspace security then mobile devices and the NFC architecture in particular provide a once-in-a-generation opportunity. We could properly secure the platform of choice for the foreseeable future.

    The IBM Two Factor Authentication demo

    Before explaining what IBM's Ortiz-Yepes has done, let's briefly review NFC, because it is often misconstrued. NFC technology has a strong brand that identifies it with contactless payments, but there is much more to it.

    "Near Field Communications" is a short range radio frequency comms protocol, suited to automatic device-to-device interfaces. To the layperson, NFC is much the same as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, the main difference being the intended operating range: 10s of metres for Wi-Fi; metres for Bluetooth; and mere centimetres for NFC.

    NFC has come to be most often used for carrying wireless payments instructions from a mobile phone to a merchant terminal. It's the technology underneath MasterCard PayPass and Visa payWave, in which your phone is loaded with an app and account information to make it behave like a contactless credit card.

    The NFC system has a few modes of operation. The one used for PayPass and payWave is "Card Emulation Mode" which is pretty self explanatory. Here an NFC phone appears to a merchant terminal as though it (the phone) is a contactless payment card. As such, the terminal and phone exchange payments messages exactly as if a card was involved; cardholder details and payment amount are confirmed and send on to the merchant's bank for processing. NFC payments has turned out to be a contentious business, with disconcertingly few success stories, and a great deal of push-back from analysts. The jury is still out on whether NFC payments will ever be sustainable.

    However, NFC technology has other tricks. Another mode is "Reader Emulation Mode" in which the mobile phone reads from (and writes to) a contactless smartcard. As an identity analyst, I find this by far the more interesting option, and it's the one that IBM researchers have exploited in their new 2FA method.

    According to what's been reported at CNET and other news outlets, a mobile and a smartcard are used in what we call a "challenge-response" combo. The basic authentication problem is to get the user to prove who she is, to the app's satisfaction. In the demo, the user is invited to authenticate herself to an app using her smartcard. Under the covers, a random challenge number is generated at a server, passed over the Internet or phone network to the mobile device which in turn sends it over NFC to the smartcard. The card then 'transforms' the challenge code into a response using a key specific to the user, and returns it to the app, which passes it back to the server. The server then verifies that the response corresponds to the challenge, and if it does, we know that the right card and therefore the right user is present.

    NOTE:Technically there are a number of ways the challenge can be transformed into a response code capable of being linked back to the original number. The most elegant way is to use asymmetric cryptography, aka digital signatures. The card would use a unique private key to encrypt the challenge into a response; the server subsequently uses a public key to try and decrypt the response. If the decrypted response matches the challenge, then we know the public key matches the private key. A PKI verifies that the expected user controls the given public-private key pair, thus authenticating that user to the card and the app.

    Further, I'd suggest the challenge-response can be effected without a server, if a public key certificate binding the user to the key pair is made available to the app. The challenge could be created in the app, sent over NFC to the card, signed by the private key in the card, and returned by NFC to be verified in the app. Local processing in this way is faster and more private involving a central server.

    Significance of the demo

    The IBM demonstration is a terrific use of the native cryptographic powers now commonplace in smartcards and mobile apps. No hardware modifications are needed to deploy the 2FA solution; all that's required is that a private key specific to the user be loaded into their smartcard at the time the card is personalised. Almost all advanced payments, entitlements and government services cards today can be provisioned in such a manner. So we can envisage a wonderful range of authorization scenarios where existing smartcards would be used by their holders for strong access control. For example:


    • Employee ID card (including US Govt PIV-I) presented to an enterprise mobile app, to access and control corporate applications, authorize purchase orders, sign company documents etc
    • Government ID card presented to a services app, for G2C functions
    • Patient ID or health insurance card presented to a health management app, for patient access to personal health records, prescriptions, claims etc.
    • Health Provider ID card presented to a professional app, to launch e-health functions like dispensing, orders, admissions, insurance payments etc,
    • Credit Card presented to a payment app, for online shopping.

    I can't believe the security industry won't now turn to use smartcards and similar chipped devices for authenticating users to mobile devices for a whole range of applications. We now have a golden opportunity to build identity and authorization security into the mobile platform in its formative stages, avoiding the awful misadventures that continue to plague PCs. Let's not blow it!

    Posted in Security, Payments, Smartcards

    Attribute wallets

    There's little debate now that attributes are at least as important as "identity" in making decisions about authorization online. This was a recurring theme at the recent Cloud Identity Summit and in subsequent discussions on Twitter, my blog site and Kuppinger Cole's. The attention to attributes might mean a return to basics, with a focus on what it is we really need to know about each other in business. It takes me back to the old APEC definition of authentication: the means by which the recipient of a transaction or message can make an assessment as to whether to accept or reject that transaction.

    A few questions remain, like what is the best way for attributes to be made available? And where does all this leave the IdP? The default architecture in many peoples' minds is that attributes should be served up online by Attribute Providers in response to Relying Party's needing to know things about Subjects instantaneously. The various real time negotiations are threaded together by one or more Identity Providers. Here I want to present an alternative but complementary vision, in which attributes are presented to Relying Parties out of digital wallets controlled by the Subjects concerned, and with little or no involvement of Identity Providers as such.

    Terminology: In this post and in most of my works I use the nouns attribute, claim and [identity] assertion interchangeably. What we're talking about are specific factoids about the first party to a transaction (the "Subject") that are interesting to the second party in the transaction (the "Relying Party" or Service Provider). In general, each attribute is vouched for by an authoritative third party referred to as an Attribute Provider. In some special cases, an RP can trust the Subject to assert certain things about themselves, but the more interesting general case is where the Relying Party needs external assurance that a given attribute is true for the Subject in question. I don't have much to say about self-asserted attributes.

    The need to know

    As much as we're all interested in identity and "trust" online, the currency of most transactions is context-specific attributes. The context of a transaction often determines (and determines completely) the attributes that determine whether a party is authorised. For example, if the Subject is a shopper, the RP a merchant and the transaction a credit card purchase, then the attributes of interest are the cardholder name, account number, billing address and maybe the card verification code. In the context of dispensing an electronic prescription, the only attribute might be the doctor's prescriber number (pharmacists of course don't care who the doctor 'really is'; notoriously they can't even read the doctor's handwriting). For authorising a purchase order on behalf of a company, the important attributes might be the employee position and staff ID. For opening a new bank account, Know-Your-Customer (KYC) rules in most jurisdictions will dictate that such attributes as legal name, address, date of birth and so on be presented in a prescribed form (typically by way of original government issued ID documents).

    For most of the common attributes of interest in routine business, there are natural recognised Attribute Authorities. Some are literally authoritative over particular attributes. Professional bodies for instance issue registration numbers to accountants, doctors, engineers and so on; employees assign staff IDs; banks issue credit card numbers. In other cases, there are de facto authorities; most famously, driver licenses are relied on almost universally as proof of age around the world.

    Sometimes rules are laid down that designate certain organisations to act as Attribute Providers - without necessarily using that term. Consider how KYC rules in effect designate Attribute Authorities. In Australia, the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (FTRA) has long established an identity verification procedure called the "100 point check". FTRA regulations prescribe a number of points to various identification documents, and in order to open a bank account here, you need to present a total of 100 points worth of documents. Notable documents include:

    • Birth certificate: 70 points
    • Current passport: 70 points
    • Australian driver licence [bearing a photo]: 40 points
    • Foreign driver licence [not necessarily bearing a photo]: 25 points
    • Credit card: 25 points.

    So in effect, the financial regulators in Australia have designated driver license bureaus and credit card issuers to be Attribute Providers for names (again, without actually using the label "AP"). Under legislated KYC rules, a bank creating a new customer account can rely on assertions made by other banks or even foreign driver license authorities about the customer's name, without needing to have any relationship with the "APs". Crucially, the bank need not investigate for itself nor understand the detailed identification processes of the "APs" listed in the KYC rules. Of course we can presume that KYC legislators took advice on the details of how various identity documents are put together, and in the event that an error is found somewhere in the production of an identity feeder document then forensic investigation would follow, but the important point is that routinely, the inner workings of all the various APs are opaque to most relying parties. The bank as RP does not need to know how a license bureau does its job.

    And yet we do know that the recognised Attribute Providers continuously improve what they do. Consider driver licenses. In Australia up until the 1970s, driver licenses were issued on paper. Then plastic cards were introduced with photographs. Numerous anti-copying measures have been rolled out since then, such as holograms, and guilloche, optically variable and micro printing. Now the first chipped driver licenses are being issued, in which cryptographic technology not only makes counterfeiting difficult but also enables digitally signed cardholder details to be transmitted electronically (the same trick utilised in EMV to stop skimming and carding). Less obvious to users, biometric facial recognition is also used now during issuance and renewal to detect fraudsters. So over time the attributes conveyed by driver licenses have not changed at all - name, address and date of birth have always meant the same thing - but the reliability of these attributes when presented via licenses is better than ever.

    Imposters are better detected during the issuance process, the medium has become steadily more secure, and, more subtly, the binding between each licence and its legitimate holder is stronger.

    We are accustomed in traditional business to dealing with others on the basis of their official credentials alone, without needing to know much about who they 'really are'. When deciding if we can accept someone in a particular transaction context, we rely on recognised providers of relevant attributes. Hotel security checks a driver license for a patron's age; householders check the official ID badges of repair people and meter readers; a pathologist checks the medical credentials of an ordering doctor; an architect only deals with licensed surveyors and structural engineers; shareholders only need to know that a company's auditors are properly certified accountants. In none of these routine cases is the personal identity of the first party of any real interest. What matters is the attributes that authorise them to deal in each context.

    Digital wallets

    Now, in the online environment, what is the best way to access attributes? My vision is of digital wallets. I advocate that users be equipped to hold close any number of recognised attributes in machine readable formats, so they can present selected attributes as the need arises, directly to Relying Parties. This sort of approach is enabled by the fact that the majority of economically important transaction settings draw on a relatively small number of attributes, and we can define a useful attribute superset in advance. As discussed previously such a superset could include:

    • {Given name, Residential address, Postal address, Date of Birth, "Over 18", Residential status, Professional qualification(s), Association Membership(s), Social security number, Student number, Employee Number, Bank account number(s), Credit card number(s), Customer Reference Number(s), Medicare Number, Health Insurance No., Health Identifier(s), OSN Membership(s)}

    Many of these attributes have just one natural authoritative provider each; others could be provided by a number of alternative organisations that happen to verify them as a matter of course and could stand ready to vouch for them. The decision to accept any AP's word for a given attribute is ultimately up to the Relying Party; each RP has its own standards for the required bona fides of the attributes it cares about.

    There are a few obvious candidates for digital attribute wallets:


    • A smart phone could come pre-loaded with attributes that have been verified as a matter of course by the telephone company, like the credit card number associated with the account, or proof of age. A digital wallet on the phone could later be topped up with additional attributes, over the air or via some other more secure over-the-counter protocol.

    • A smart driver license could hold digital certificates signed by the licensing bureau, asserting name, address, date of birth, and/or simpler de-identified statements like "the older is over 18". Note that the assertions could be made separately or in useful combinations; for privacy, a proof of age certificate need not name the holder but simply specify that the assertion is carried on a particular type of chip, signed by the authoritative issuer.

    • When you receive a smart bank card, the issuer bank could load the chip with your name, address, date of birth, PANs and/or certified copies of identity documents presented to open the account. Such personal identity assertions could then be presented by the customer to other RPs like financial institutions or retailers to originate other accounts.

    Do we need an "Identity Provider" to thread together these attributes? No. While it is important that RPs can trust that each attribute is in the right hands, the issuance process (including the provisioning of attribute carrying tokens like cards and mobile phones) is just one aspect of the Attribute Provider's job. If we can trust say a licensing bureau to verify the particulars of a license holder, then we can also trust them as part of that process to ensure that the license is in the hands of its rightful owner.

    In contrast with the real time 'negotiated' attributes exchange architectures, the digital wallet approach has the following advantages:


    • Decentralised architecture: lower cost and quicker to deploy; we can start local and scale up as Attribute Providers gain ground;

    • Fast: digitally signed attributes presented from smart devices diret to Relying Parties can be cryptographically verified instantaneously, for higher performance, especially in bandwidth limited environments.

    • Intrinsically private: Direct presentation of attributes minimises the exposure of personal information to third parties.

    • ”Natural”: Digital wallets of attributes is congruent with the way we hold diverse pieces of personal documentation in regular wallets; unlike big federation model, no novel new intermediaries are involved.

    • Legally simpler: It is relatively simple matter for Attribute Authorities to warrant the accuracy of separate particulars like name, date of birth, account number, without any making any other broad representations of who the Subject 'really is'. There is none of the legal fine print that bedevilled Big PKI Certification Authorities in the past and which proved fatal in federation programs like the Internet Industry Association 2FA pilot.

    Notes

    • On a case by case basis, as dictated by their risk management strategies, RPs can revert to an online AP to check the up-to-the-minute validity of an attribute. In practice this is not necessary in many cases; many of the common attributes in business are static, and once issued (or vouched for by a reputable body) do not change. If attributes are conveyed by digital certificates, then their validity can be efficiently checked online by OCSP and near-line by CRL.
    • The patient smartcards already widespread in Europe are an ideal carrier for a plurality of human services identifiers (such as public health insurance numbers, health record identifiers, medical social networking handles, and research tracking numbers; see also a previous presentation on anonymity and pseudonymity in e-research).
    • As other conventional plastic cards are progressively upgraded to chip - such as the proposed US Medicare card modernization - we have a natural opportunity to load them with secure digital assertions too.
    • In the medium to long term, digitally signed attributes could be made to chain through communities of CAs to a small number of globally recognised Root Authorities. For a model, refer to s4.4 "How to convey fitness for purpose" of my Public Key Superstructure presentation to the 2008 NIST IDTrust workshop.

    Posted in Smartcards, Security, Identity, Federated Identity, Trust

    Killing two frauds with one chip

    Last week saw the biggest credit card data breach for a while, with around 1.5 million card numbers being stolen by organised crime from processor Global Payments [updated figures per Global Payments investor conference call, Apr 2nd].

    So now there will be another few rounds of debate about how to harden these cardholder databases against criminal infiltration, and whether or not the processor was PCI-DSS compliant. Meanwhile, stolen card numbers can be replayed with impugnity and all the hapless customers can do is monitor their accounts for suspicious activity -- which can occur years later.

    These days, the main use for stolen payment card data is Card Not Present (CNP) fraud. Traditional "carding" -- where data stolen by skimming is duplicated onto blank mag stripe cards to fool POS terminals or ATMs -- has been throttled in most places by Chip-and-PIN, leaving CNP as organised crime's preferred modus operandi. CNP fraud now makes up three quarters of all card fraud in markets like Australia, and is growing at 40-50% p.a.

    All card fraud exploits a specific weakness in the Four Party card settlement system shown below. The model is decades old, and remains the foundation of internationally interoperable cards. In a triumph of technology neutrality, the four party arrangement was unchanged by the advent of e-commerce. The one problem with the system is that merchants accepting card numbers may be vulnerable to stolen numbers. Magnetic stripe terminals and Internet servers are unable to tell original cardholder data from copies replayed by fraudsters.

    Blog Card Fraud 120401  SLIDE 1 Four Party


    The most important improvment to the payments system was and still is to make card numbers non-replayable. Chip-and-PIN stops carding thanks to cryptographic processes implemented in hardware (the chip) where they cannot be tampered with, and where the secret keys that criminals would need are inaccessible. In essence, a Chip-and-PIN card encrypts customer data within the secure chip (actually, digitally signs it) using keys that never leave the confines of the integrated circuit. Even if a criminal obtains the card holder data, they are unable to apply the additional cryptographic transformations to create legible EMV card-present transactions. This is how Chip-and-PIN stemmed skimming and carding.

    Blog Card Fraud 120401  SLIDE 2 Mag Stripe


    CNP fraud is just online carding, fuelled by industrial scale theft of customer records by organised crime, like the recent Global Payments episode. While the PCI-DSS regime reduces accidental losses and amateur attacks, it remains powerless to stop determined criminals, let alone corrupt insiders. When card numbers are available by the tens of millions, and worth several dollars each ($25 or more for platinum cards) truly nothing can stop them from being purloined.

    The best way to tackle CNP fraud is to leverage the same hardware based cryptography that prevents skimming and carding.

    Blog Card Fraud 120401  SLIDE 3 CNP


    Lockstep Technologies has developed and proven such a solution. Our award winning Stepwise digitally signs CNP transactions within an EMV chip, rendering card details sent to the merchant non-replayable. The merchant server checks a Stepwise CNP transaction using standard public key libraries; a valid Stepwise transaction can only have come from a genuine Chip-and-PIN card under the control of its holder.

    All serious transaction and payments systems use hardware cryptography. The classic examples include mobile telephones' SIM cards, EMV chips, the Hardware Security Modules mandated by financial regulators in all ATMs, and the "secure elements" of NFC devices. With well designed hardware security, we gain a robust upper hand in the cybercrime arms race. So let's stop struggling with flabby distracting systems like 3D Secure, and let's stop pretending that PCI-DSS audits will stop organised crime getting hold of card numbers by the million. Instead, let's kill two birds with one stone and use chips to secure both card present and CNP transactions.

    Stepwise creates uniquely secure, fast and easy-to-use CNP payments. It has zero impact on the security certifications of digital signature capable EMV chips, and zero impact on existing four party card processing arrangements.

    For more details, please see http://lockstep.com.au/technologies/stepwise.

    Posted in Smartcards, Payments, Fraud