The State Of Identity Management in 2015
Constellation Research recently launched the "State of Enterprise Technology" series of research reports. These assess the current enterprise innovations which Constellation considers most crucial to digital transformation, and provide snapshots of the future usage and evolution of these technologies.
My second contribution to the state-of-the-state series is "Identity Management Moves from Who to What". Here's an excerpt from the report:
In spite of all the fuss, personal identity is not usually important in routine business. Most transactions are authorized according to someone’s credentials, membership, role or other properties, rather than their personal details. Organizations actually deal with many people in a largely impersonal way. People don’t often care who someone really is before conducting business with them. So in digital Identity Management (IdM), one should care less about who a party is than what they are, with respect to attributes that matter in the context we’re in. This shift in focus is coming to dominate the identity landscape, for it simplifies a traditionally multi-disciplined problem set. Historically, the identity management community has made too much of identity!
Six Digital Identity Trends for 2015
1. Mobile becomes the center of gravity for identity. The mobile device brings convergence for a decade of progress in IdM. For two-factor authentication, the cell phone is its own second factor, protected against unauthorized use by PIN or biometric. Hardly anyone ever goes anywhere without their mobile - service providers can increasingly count on that without disenfranchising many customers. Best of all, the mobile device itself joins authentication to the app, intimately and seamlessly, in the transaction context of the moment. And today’s phones have powerful embedded cryptographic processors and key stores for accurate mutual authentication, and mobile digital wallets, as Apple’s Tim Cook highlighted at the recent White House Cyber Security Summit.
2. Hardware is the key – and holds the keys – to identity. Despite the lure of the cloud, hardware has re-emerged as pivotal in IdM. All really serious security and authentication takes place in secure dedicated hardware, such as SIM cards, ATMs, EMV cards, and the new Trusted Execution Environment mobile devices. Today’s leading authentication initiatives, like the FIDO Alliance, are intimately connected to standard cryptographic modules now embedded in most mobile devices. Hardware-based identity management has arrived just in the nick of time, on the eve of the Internet of Things.
3. The “Attributes Push” will shift how we think about identity. In the words of Andrew Nash, CEO of Confyrm Inc. (and previously the identity leader at PayPal and Google), “Attributes are at least as interesting as identities, if not more so.” Attributes are to identity as genes are to organisms – they are really what matters about you when you’re trying to access a service. By fractionating identity into attributes and focusing on what we really need to reveal about users, we can enhance privacy while automating more and more of our everyday transactions.
The Attributes Push may recast social logon. Until now, Facebook and Google have been widely tipped to become “Identity Providers”, but even these giants have found federated identity easier said than done. A dark horse in the identity stakes – LinkedIn – may take the lead with its superior holdings in verified business attributes.
4. The identity agenda is narrowing. For 20 years, brands and organizations have obsessed about who someone is online. And even before we’ve solved the basics, we over-reached. We've seen entrepreneurs trying to monetize identity, and identity engineers trying to convince conservative institutions like banks that “Identity Provider” is a compelling new role in the digital ecosystem. Now at last, the IdM industry agenda is narrowing toward more achievable and more important goals - precise authentication instead of general identification.
5. A digital identity stack is emerging. The FIDO Alliance and others face a challenge in shifting and improving the words people use in this space. Words, of course, matter, as do visualizations. IdM has suffered for too long under loose and misleading metaphors. One of the most powerful abstractions in IT was the OSI networking stack. A comparable sort of stack may be emerging in IdM.
6. Continuity will shape the identity experience. Continuity will make or break the user experience as the lines blur between real world and virtual, and between the Internet of Computers and the Internet of Things. But at the same time, we need to preserve clear boundaries between our digital personae, or else privacy catastrophes await. “Continuous” (also referred to as “Ambient”) Authentication is a hot new research area, striving to provide more useful and flexible signals about the instantaneous state of a user at any time. There is an explosion in devices now that can be tapped for Continuous Authentication signals, and by the same token, rich new apps in health, lifestyle and social domains, running on those very devices, that need seamless identity management.
A snapshot at my report "Identity Moves from Who to What" is available for download at Constellation Research. It expands on the points above, and sets out recommendations for enterprises to adopt the latest identity management thinking.
I have just updated my periodic series of researh reports on the FIDO Alliance. The fourth report, "FIDO Alliance Update: On Track to a Standard" will be available at Constellation Research shortly
The Identity Management industry leader publishes its protocol specifications at v1.0, launches a certification program, and attracts support in Microsoft Windows 10.
The FIDO Alliance is the fastest-growing Identity Management (IdM) consortium we have seen. Comprising technology vendors, solutions providers, consumer device companies, and e-commerce services, the FIDO Alliance is working on protocols and standards to strongly authenticate users and personal devices online. With a fresh focus and discipline in this traditionally complicated field, FIDO envisages simply “doing for authentication what Ethernet did for networking”.
Launched in early 2013, the FIDO Alliance has now grown to over 180 members. Included are technology heavyweights like Google, Lenovo and Microsoft; almost every SIM and smartcard supplier; payments giants Discover, MasterCard, PayPal and Visa; several banks; and e-commerce players like Alibaba and Netflix.
FIDO is radically different from any IdM consortium to date. We all know how important it is to fix passwords: They’re hard to use, inherently insecure, and lie at the heart of most breaches. The Federated Identity movement seeks to reduce the number of passwords by sharing credentials, but this invariably confounds the relationships we have with services and complicates liability when more parties rely on fewer identities.
In contrast, FIDO’s mission is refreshingly clear: Take the smartphones and devices most of us are intimately connected to, and use the built-in cryptography to authenticate users to services. A registered FIDO-compliant device, when activated by its user, can send verified details about the device and the user to service providers, via standardized protocols. FIDO leverages the ubiquity of sophisticated handsets and the tidal wave of smart things. The Alliance focuses on device level protocols without venturing to change the way user accounts are managed or shared.
The centerpieces of FIDO’s technical work are two protocols, called UAF and U2F, for exchanging verified authentication signals between devices and services. Several commercial applications have already been released under the UAF and U2F specifications, including fingerprint-based payments apps from Alibaba and PayPal, and Google’s Security Key from Yubico. After a rigorous review process, both protocols are published now at version 1.0, and the FIDO Certified Testing program was launched in April 2015. And Microsoft announced that FIDO support would be built into Windows 10.
With its focus, pragmatism and membership breadth, FIDO is today’s go-to authentication standards effort. In this report, I look at what the FIDO Alliance has to offer vendors and end user communities, and its critical success factors.
The Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA) releases card fraud statistics every six months for the preceding 12m period. Lockstep monitors these figures and plots the trend data. We got a bit too busy in 2014 and missed the last couple of APCA releases, so this blog is a catch up, summarising and analysing stats from calendar year 2013 and AU financial year 2014 (July 2013 to June 2014).
In the 12 months to June 2014,
- Total card fraud rose by 22% to A$321 million
- Card Not Present (CNP) fraud rose 27% to A$256 million
- CNP fraud now represents 80% of all card fraud.
APCA is one of the major payments systems regulators in Australia. It has only ever had two consistent things to say about Card Not Present fraud. First, it reassures the public that CNP fraud is only rising because online shopping is rising, implying that it's really not a big deal. Second, APCA produces advice for shoppers and merchants to help them stay safe online.
I suppose that in the 1950s and 60s, when the road toll started rising dranatically and car makers we called on to improve safety, the auto industry might have played down that situation like APCA does with CNP fraud. "Of course the road toll is high" they might have said; "it's because so many people love driving!". Fraud is not a necessary part of online shopping; at some point payments regulators will have to tell us, as a matter of policy, what level of fraud they think is actually reasonable, and start to press the industry to take action. In absolute terms, CNP fraud has ballooned by a factor of 10 in the past eight years. The way it's going, annual online fraud might overtake the cost of car theft (currently $680 million) before 2020.
As for APCA's advice for shoppers to stay safe online, most of it is nearly useless. In their Christmas 2014 media release (PDF), APCA suggested:
Consumers can take simple steps to help stay safe when shopping online including:
- Only providing their card details on secure websites – looking for the locked padlock.
- Always keeping their PC security software up-to-date and doing a full scan often.
The truth is very few payment card details are stolen from websites or people's computers. Organised crime targets the databases of payment processors and big merchants, where they steal the details of tens of millions of cardholders at once. Four of the biggest ever known credit card breaches occurred in the last 18 months (Ref: DataLossDB):
- 109,000,000 credit cards - Home Depot, September 2014
- 110,000,000 credit cards - Target, December 2013
- 145,000,000 credit cards - eBay, May 2014
- 152,000,000 credit cards - Adobe, Oct 2013.
In its latest Data Breach Investigations Report, Verizon states that "2013 may be remembered as ... a year of transition to large-scale attacks on payment card systems".
Verizon has plotted the trends in data breaches at different sources; it's very clear that servers (where the datsa is held) have always been the main target of cybercriminals, and are getting proportionally more attention year on year. Diagrag at right from Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report 2014.
So APCA's advice to look for website padlocks and keep anti-virus up-to-date - as important as that may be - won't do much at all to curb payment card theft or fraud. You might never have shopped online in your life, and still have your card details stolen, behind your back, at a department store breach.
Over the course of a dozen or more card fraud reports, APCA has had an on-again-off-again opinion of the credit card scheme's flagship CNP security measure, 3D Secure. In FY2011 (after CNP fraud went up 46%), APCA said "retailers should be looking at a 3D Secure solution for their online checkout". Then in their FY2012 media release, as losses kept increasing, they made no mention of 3D Secure at all.
Calendar year 2012 saw Australian CNP fraud fall for the first time ever, and APCA was back on the 3D Secure bandwagon, reporting that "The drop in CNP fraud can largely be attributed to an increase in the use of authentication tools such as MasterCard SecureCode and Verified by Visa, as well as dedicated fraud prevention tools."
Sadly, it seems 2012 was a blip. Online fraud for FY2014 (PDF) has returned to the long term trend. It's impossible to say what impact 3D Secure has really had in Australia, but penetration and consumer awareness of this technology remains low. It was surprising that APCA previously rushed to attribute a short-term drop in fraud to 3D Secure; that now seems overly optimistic, with CNP frauds continuing to mount after all.
In my view, it beggars belief the payments industry has yet to treat CNP fraud as seriously as it did skimming and carding. Technologically, CNP fraud is not a hard problem. It's just the digital equivalent of analogue skimming and carding, and it could be stopped just as effectively by using chips to protect cardholder data, just as they do in Card Present payments, whether by EMV card or NFC mobile devices.
In 2012, I published a short paper on this: Calling for a Uniform Approach to Card Fraud Offline and On (PDF).
The credit card payments system is a paragon of standardisation. No other industry has such a strong history of driving and adopting uniform technologies, infrastructure and business processes. No matter where you keep a bank account, you can use a globally branded credit card to go shopping in almost every corner of the world. The universal Four Party settlement model, and a long-standing card standard that works the same with ATMs and merchant terminals everywhere underpin seamless convenience. So with this determination to facilitate trustworthy and supremely convenient spending in every corner of the earth, it’s astonishing that the industry is still yet to standardise Internet payments. We settled on the EMV standard for in-store transactions, but online we use a wide range of confusing and largely ineffective security measures. As a result, Card Not Present (CNP) fraud is growing unchecked.
This article argues that all card payments should be properly secured using standardised hardware. In particular, CNP transactions should use the very same EMV chip and cryptography as do card present payments.
An unpublished letter to the editor of The New Yorker, February 2015.
Alec Wilkinson says in his absorbing profile of the quiet genius Yitang Zhang ("The pursuit of beauty", February 2) that pure mathematics is done "with no practical purposes in mind". I do hope mathematicians will forever be guided by aesthetics more than economics, but nevertheless, pure maths has become a cornerstone of the Information Age, just as physics was of the Industrial Revolution. For centuries, prime numbers might have been intellectual curios but in the 1970s they were beaten into modern cryptography. The security codes that scaffold almost all e-commerce are built from primes. Any advances in understanding these abstract materials impacts the Internet itself, for better or for worse. So when Zhang demurs that his result is "useless for industry", he's mispeaking.
The online version of the article is subtitled "Solving an Unsolvable Problem". The apparent oxymoron belies a wondrous pattern we see in mathematical discovery. Conundrums widely accepted to be impossible are in fact solved quite often, and then frenetic periods of innovation usually follow. The surprise breakthrough is typically inefficient (or, far worse in a mathematician's mind, ugly) but it can inspire fresh thinking and lead to polished methods. We are in one of these intense creative periods right now. Until 2008, it was widely thought that true electronic cash was impossible, but then the mystery figure Satoshi Nakamoto created Bitcoin. While it overturned the conventional wisdom, Bitcoin is slow and anarchic, and problematic as mainstream money. But it has triggered a remarkable explosion of digital currency innovation.
A published letter
As Alec Wilkinson points out in his Profile of the math genius Yitang Zhang, results in pure mathematics can be sources of wonder and delight, regardless of their applications. Yet applications do crop up. Nineteenth-century mathematicians showed that there are geometries as logical and complete as Euclidean geometry, but which are utterly distinct from it. This seemed of no practical use at the time, but Albert Einstein used non-Euclidean geometry to make the most successful model that we have of the behavior of the universe on large scales of distance and time. Abstract results in number theory, Zhang’s field, underlie cryptography used to protect communication on devices that many of us use every day. Abstract mathematics, beautiful in itself, continually results in helpful applications, and that’s pretty wonderful and delightful, too.
Sandy Spring, Md.
My favorite example of mathematical innovation concerns public key cryptography (and I ignore here the credible reports that PKC was invented by the Brits decades before but kept secret). For centuries, there was essentially one family of cryptographic algorithms, in which a secret key shared by sender and recipient is used to both encrypt and decrypt the protected communication. Key distribution is the central problem in so-called "Symmetric" Cryptography: how does the sender get the secret key to the recipient some time before sending the message? The dream was for the two parties to be able to establish a secret key without ever having to meet or using any secret channel. It was thought to be an unsolvable problem ... until it was solved by Ralph Merkle in 1974. His solution, dubbed "Merkle's Puzzles" was almost hypothetical; the details don't matter here but they were going to be awkward to put it mildly, involving millions of small messages. But the impact on cryptography was near instantaneous. The fact that, in theory, two parties really could establish a shared secret via public messages triggered a burst of development of practical public key cryptography, first of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, and then RSA by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman. We probably wouldn't have e-commerce if it wasn't for Merkle's crazy curious maths.
This is Part 2 of my coverage of the White House #CyberSecuritySummit; see Part 1 here.
On Feb 13th, at President Obama's request, a good number of the upper echelon of Internet experts gathered at Stanford University in Silicon Valley to work out what to do next about cybersecurity and consumer protection online. The Cyber Security Summit was put together around Obama's signing a new Executive Order to create new cyber threat information sharing hubs and standards to foster sharing while protecting privacy, and it was meant to maintain the momentum of his cybersecurity and privacy legislative program.
The main session of the summit traversed very few technical security issues. The dominant theme was intelligence sharing: how can business and government share what they know in real time about vulnerabilities and emerging cyber attacks? Just a couple of speakers made good points about preventative measures. Intel President Renee James highlighted the importance of a "baseline of computing security"; MasterCard CEO Ajay Banga was eloquent on how innovation can thrive in a safety-oriented regulated environment like road infrastructure and road rules. So apart from these few deviations, the summit had a distinct military intelligence vibe, in keeping with the cyber warfare trope beloved by politicians.
On the one hand, it would be naive to expect such an event to make actual progress. And I don't mind a political showcase if it secures the commitment of influencers and builds awareness. But on the other hand, the root causes of our cybersecurity dilemma have been well known for years, and this esteemed gathering seemed oblivious to them.
Where's the serious talk of preventing cyber security problems? Where is the attention to making e-business platforms and digital economy infostructure more robust?
Personal Information today is like nitroglycerin - it has to be handled with the utmost care, lest it blow up in your face. So we have the elaborate and brittle measures of PCI-DSS or the HIPAA security rules, rendered useless by the slightest operational slip-up.
How about rendering personal information safer online, so it cannot be stolen, co-opted, modified and replayed? If stolen information couldn't be used by identity thieves with impunity, we would neutralise the bulk of today's cybercrime. This is how EMV Chip & PIN payment security works. Personal data and purchase details are combined in a secure chip and digitally signed under the customer's control, to prove to the merchant that the transaction was genuine. The signed transaction data cannot be easily hacked (thanks Jim Fenton for the comment; see below); stolen identity data is useless to a thief if they don't control the chip; a stolen chip is only good for single transactions (and only if the PIN is stolen as well) rather than the mass fraud perpetrated after raiding large databases.
It's obvious (isn't it?) that we need to do something radically different before the Internet of Things turns into a digital cesspool. The good news for privacy and security in ubiquitous computing is that most smart devices can come with Secure Elements and built-in digital signature capability, so that all the data they broadcast can be given pedigree. We should be able to know tell for sure that every piece of information flowing in the IoT has come from a genuine device, with definite attributes, operating with the consent of its owner.
The technical building blocks for a properly secure IoT are at hand. Machine-to-Machine (M2M) identity modules (MIMs) and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide safe key storage and cryptographic functionality. The FIDO Alliance protocols leverage this embedded hardware and enable personal attributes to be exchanged reliably. Only a couple of years ago, Vint Cerf in an RSA Conference keynote speculated that ubiquitous public key cryptography would play a critical role in the Internet of Things, but he didn't know how exactly.
In fact, we have have known what to do with this technology for years.
At the close of the Cyber Security Summit, President Obama signed his Executive Order -- in ink. The irony of using a pen to sign a cybersecurity order seemed lost on all concerned. And it is truly tragic.
We probably wouldn't need a cybersecurity summit in 2015 if serious identity security had been built into the cyber infrastructure over a decade ago.
It would be naive to expect the White House Cybersecurity Summit to have been less political. President Obama and his colleagues were in their comfort zone, talking up America's recent economic turnaround, and framing their recent wins squarely within Silicon Valley where the summit took place. With a few exceptions, the first two hours was more about green energy, jobs and manufacturing than cyber security. It was a lot like a lost episode of The West Wing.
The exceptions were important. Some speakers really nailed some security issues. I especially liked the morning contributions from Intel President Renee James and MasterCard CEO Ajay Banga. James highlighted that Intel has worked for 10 years to improve "the baseline of computing security", making her one of the few speakers to get anywhere near the inherent insecurity of our cyber infrastructure. The truth is that cyberspace is built on weak foundations; the software development practices and operating systems that bear the economy today were not built for the job. For mine, the Summit was too much about military/intelligence themed information sharing, and not enough about why our systems are so precarious. I know it's a dry subject but if they're serious about security, policy makers really have to engage with software quality and reliability, instead of thrilling to kids learning to code. Software development practices are to blame for many of our problems; more on software failures here.
Ajay Banga was one of several speakers to urge the end of passwords. He summed up the authentication problem very nicely: "Stop making us remember things in order to prove who we are". He touched on MasterCard's exploration of continuous authentication bracelets and biometrics (more news of which coincidentally came out today). It's important however that policy makers' understanding of digital infrastructure resilience, cybercrime and cyber terrorism isn't skewed by everyone's favourite security topic - customer authentication. Yes, it's in need of repair, yet authentication is not to blame for the vast majority of breaches. Mom and Pop struggle with passwords and they deserve better, but the vast majority of stolen personal data is lifted by organised criminals en masse from poorly secured back-end databases. Replacing customer passwords or giving everyone biometrics is not going to solve the breach epidemic.
Banga also indicated that the Information Highway should be more like road infrastructure. He highlighted that national routes are regulated, drivers are licensed, there are rules of the road, standardised signs, and enforcement. All these infrastructure arrangements leave plenty of room for innovation in car design, but it's accepted that "all cars have four wheels".
Tim Cook was then the warm-up act before Obama. Many on Twitter unkindly branded Cook's speech as an ad for Apple, paid for by the White House, but I'll accentuate the positives. Cook continues to campaign against business models that monetize personal data. He repeated his promise made after the ApplePay launch that they will not exploit the data they have on their customers. He put privacy before security in everything he said.
Cook painted a vision where digital wallets hold your passport, driver license and other personal documents, under the user's sole control, and without trading security for convenience. I trust that he's got the mobile phone Secure Element in mind; until we can sort out cybersecurity at large, I can't support the counter trend towards cloud-based wallets. The world's strongest banks still can't guarantee to keep credit card numbers safe, so we're hardly ready to put our entire identities in the cloud.
In his speech, President Obama reiterated his recent legislative agenda for information sharing, uniform breach notification, student digital privacy, and a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. He stressed the need for private-public partnership and cybersecurity responsibility to be shared between government and business. He reiterated the new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. And as flagged just before the summit, the president signed an Executive Order that will establish cyber threat information sharing "hubs" and standards to foster sharing while protecting privacy.
Obama told the audience that cybersecurity "is not an ideological issue". Of course that message was actually for Congress which is deliberating over his cyber legislation. But let's take a moment to think about how ideology really does permeate this arena. Three quasi-religious disputes come to mind immediately:
- Free speech trumps privacy. The ideals of free speech have been interpreted in the US in such a way that makes broad-based privacy law intractable. The US is one of only two major nations now without a general data protection statute (the other is China). It seems this impasse is rarely questioned anymore by either side of the privacy debate, but perhaps the scope of the First Amendment has been allowed to creep out too far, for now free speech rights are in effect being granted even to computers. Look at the controversy over the "Right to be Forgotten" (RTBF), where Google is being asked to remove certain personal search results if they are irrelevant, old and inaccurate. Jimmy Wales claims this requirement harms "our most fundamental rights of expression and privacy". But we're not talking about speech here, or even historical records, but rather the output of a computer algorithm, and a secret algorithm at that, operated in the service of an advertising business. The vociferous attacks on RTBF are very ideological indeed.
- "Innovation" trumps privacy. It's become an unexamined mantra that digital businesses require unfettered access to information. I don't dispute that some of the world's richest ever men, and some of the world's most powerful ever corporations have relied upon the raw data that exudes from the Internet. It's just like the riches uncovered by the black gold rush on the 1800s. But it's an ideological jump to extrapolate that all cyber innovation or digital entrepreneurship must continue the same way. Rampant data mining is laying waste to consumer confidence and trust in the Internet. Some reasonable degree of consumer rights regulation seems inevitable, and just, if we are to avert a digital Tragedy of the Commons.
- National Security trumps privacy. I am a rare privacy advocate who actually agrees that the privacy-security equilibrium needs to be adjusted. I believe the world has changed since some of our foundational values were codified, and civil liberties are just one desirable property of a very complicated social system. However, I call out one dimensional ideology when national security enthusiasts assert that privacy has to take a back seat. There are ways to explore a measured re-calibration of privacy, to maintain proportionality, respect and trust.
President Obama described the modern technological world as a "magnificent cathedral" and he made an appeal to "values embedded in the architecture of the system". We should look critically at whether the values of entrepreneurship, innovation and competitiveness embedded in the way digital business is done in America could be adjusted a little, to help restore the self-control and confidence that consumers keep telling us is evaporating online.
If the digital economy is really the economy then it's high time we moved beyond hoping that we can simply train users to be safe online. Is the real economy only for heros who can protect themselves in the jungle, writing their own code. As if they're carrying their own guns? Or do we as a community build structures and standards and insist on technologies that work for all?
For most people, the World Wide Web experience still a lot like watching cartoons on TV. The human-machine interface is almost the same. The images and actions are just as synthetic; crucially, nothing on a web browser is real. Almost anything goes -- just as the Roadrunner defies gravity in besting Coyote, there are no laws of physics that temper the way one bit of multimedia leads to the next. Yes, there is a modicum of user feedback in the way we direct some of the action when browsing and e-shopping, but it's quite illusory; for the most part all we're really doing is flicking channels across a billion pages.
It's the suspension of disbelief when browsing that lies at the heart of many of the safety problems we're now seeing. Inevitably we lose our bearings in the totally synthetic World Wide Web. We don't even realise it, we're taken in by a virtual reality, and we become captive to social engineering.
But I don't think it's possible to tackle online safety by merely countering users' credulity. Education is not the silver bullet, because the Internet is really so technologically complex and abstract that it lies beyond the comprehension of most lay people.
Using the Internet 'safely' today requires deep technical skills, comparable to the level of expertise needed to operate an automobile circa 1900. Back then you needed to be able to do all your own mechanics [roughly akin to the mysteries of maintaining anti-virus software], look after the engine [i.e. configure the operating system and firewall], navigate the chaotic emerging road network [there's yet no trusted directory for the Internet, nor any road rules], and even figure out how to fuel the contraption [consumer IT supply chains is about as primitive as the gasoline industry was 100 years ago]. The analogy with the early car industry becomes especially sharp for me when I hear utopian open source proponents argue that writing ones own software is the best way to be safe online.
The Internet is so critical (I'd have thought this was needless to say) that we need ways of working online that don't require us to all be DIY experts.
I wrote a first draft of this blog six years ago, and at that time I called for patience in building digital literacy and sophistication. "It took decades for safe car and road technologies to evolve, and the Internet is still really in its infancy" I said in 2009. But I'm less relaxed about his now, on the brink of the Internet of Things. It's great that the policy makers like the US FTC are calling on connected device makers to build in security and privacy, but I suspect the Internet of Things will require the same degree of activist oversight and regulation as does the auto industry, for the sake of public order and the economy. Do we have the appetite to temper breakneck innovation with safety rules?
This is a watershed in Internet security and privacy - never before has authentication been a headline consumer issue.
Sure we've all talked about the password problem for ten years or more, but now FIDO Alliance members are doing something about it, with easy-to-use solutions designed specifically for mass adoption.
The FIDO Alliance is designing the authentication plumbing for everything online. They are creating new standards and technical protocols allowing secure personal devices (phones, personal smart keys, wearables, and soon a range of regular appliances) to securely transmit authentication data to cloud services and other devices, in some cases eliminating passwords altogether.
See also my ongoing FIDO Alliance research at Constellation.
In electronic business, Relying Parties (RPs) need to understand their risks of dealing with the wrong person (say a fraudulent customer or a disgruntled ex employee), determine what they really need to know about those people in order to help manage risk, and then in many cases, design a registration process for bringing those people into the business fold. With federated identity, the aim is to offload the registration and other overheads onto an Identity Provider (IdP). But evaluating IdPs and forging identity management arrangements has proven to be enormously complex, and the federated identity movement has been looking for ways to streamline and standardize the process.
One approach is to categorise different classes of IdP, matched to different transaction types. "Levels of Assurance" (LOAs) have been loosely standardised by many governments and in some federated identity frameworks, like the Kantara Initiative. The US Authentication Guideline NIST SP 800-63 is one of the preeminent de facto standards, adopted by the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC). But over the years, adoption of SP 800-63 in business has been disappointing, and now NIST has announced a review.
One of my problem with LOAs is simply stated: I don't believe it's possible to pigeon-hole risk.
With risk management, the devil is in the detail. Risk Management standards like ISO 31000 require organisations to start by analysing the threats that are peculiar to their environment. It's folly to take short cuts here, and it's also well recognised that you cannot "outsource" liability.
To my mind, the LOA philosophy goes against risk management fundamental. To come up with an LOA rating is an intermediate step that takes an RP's risk analysis, squeezes it into a bin (losing lots of information as a result), which is then used to shortlist candidate IdPs, before going into detailed due diligence where all those risk details need to be put back on the table.
I think we all know by now of cases where RPs have looked at candidate IdPs at a given LOA, been less than satisfied with the available offerings, and have felt the need for an intermediate level, something like "LOA two and a half" (this problem was mentioned at CIS 2014 more than once, and I have seen it first hand in the UK IDAP).
Clearly what's going on here is an RP's idea of "LOA 2" differs from a given IdP's idea of the same LOA 2. This is because everyone's risk appetite and threat profile is different. Moreover, the detailed prescription of "LOA 2" must differ from one identity provider to the next. When an RP thinks they need "LOA 2.5" what they're relly asking for is a customised identification. If an off-the-shelf "LOA 2" isn't what it seems, then there can't be any hope for an agreed intermediate LOA 2.5. Even if an IdP and an RP agree in one instance, soon enough we will get a fresh call for "LOA 2.75 please".
We cannot pigeonhole risk. Attaching chunky one dimensional Levels of Assurance is misleading. There is no getting away from the need to do detailed analysis of the threats and therefore the authentication needs required.
This is an updated version of arguments made in Lockstep's submission to the 2009 Cyber Crime Inquiry by the Australian federal government.
In stark contrast to other fields, cyber safety policy is almost exclusively preoccupied with user education. It's really an obsession. Governments and industry groups churn out volumes of well-meaning and technically reasonable security advice, but for the average user, this material is overwhelming. There is a subtle implication that security is for experts, and that the Internet isn't safe unless you go to extremes. Moreover, even if consumers do their very best online, their personal details can still be taken over in massive criminal raids on databases that hardly anyone even know exist.
Too much onus is put on regular users protecting themselves online, and this blinds us to potential answers to cybercrime. In other walks of life, we accept a balanced approach to safety, and governments are less reluctant to impose standards than they are on the Internet. Road safety for instance rests evenly on enforceable road rules, car technology innovation, certified automotive products, mandatory quality standards, traffic management systems, and driver training and licensing. Education alone would be nearly worthless.
Around cybercrime we have a bizarre allergy to technology. We often hear that 'Preventing data breaches not a technology issue' which may be politically correct but it's faintly ridiculous. Nobody would ever say that preventing car crashes is 'not a technology issue'.
Credit card fraud and ID theft in general are in dire need of concerted technological responses. Consider that our Card Not Present (CNP) payments processing arrangements were developed many years ago for mail orders and telephone orders. It was perfectly natural to co-opt the same processes when the Internet arose, since it seemed simply to be just another communications medium. But the Internet turned out to be more than an extra channel: it connects everyone to everything, around the clock.
The Internet has given criminals x-ray vision into peoples' banking details, and perfect digital disguises with which to defraud online merchants. There are opportunities for crime now that are both quantitatively and qualitatively radically different from what went before. In particular, because identity data is available by the terabyte and digital systems cannot tell copies from originals, identity takeover is child's play.
You don't even need to have ever shopped online to run foul of CNP fraud. Most stolen credit card numbers are obtained en masse by criminals breaking into obscure backend databases. These attacks go on behind the scenes, out of sight of even the most careful online customers.
So the standard cyber security advice misses the point. Consumers are told earnestly to look out for the "HTTPS" padlock that purportedly marks a site as secure, to have a firewall, to keep their PCs "patched" and their anti-virus up to date, to only shop online at reputable merchants, and to avoid suspicious looking sites (as if cyber criminals aren't sufficiently organised to replicate legitimate sites in their entirety). But none of this advice touches on the problem of coordinated massive heists of identity data.
Merchants are on the hook for unwieldy and increasingly futile security overheads. When a business wishes to accept credit card payments, it's straightforward in the real world to install a piece of bank-approved terminal equipment. But to process credit cards online, shopkeepers have to sign up to onerous PCI-DSS requirements that in effect require even small business owners to become IT security specialists. But to what end? No audit regime will ever stop organised crime. To stem identity theft, we need to make stolen IDs less valuable.
All this points to urgent public policy matters for governments and banks. It is not enough to put the onus on individuals to guard against ad hoc attacks on their credit cards. Systemic changes and technological innovation are needed to render stolen personal data useless to thieves. It's not that the whole payments processing system is broken; rather, it is vulnerable at just one point where stolen digital identities can be abused.
Digital identities are the keys to our personal kingdoms. As such they really need to be treated as seriously as car keys, which have become very high tech indeed. Modern car keys cannot be duplicated at a suburban locksmith. It's possible you've come across office and filing cabinet keys that carry government security certifications. And we never use the same keys for our homes and offices; we wouldn't even consider it (which points to the basic weirdness in Single Sign On and identity federation).
In stark contrast to car keys, almost no attention is paid to the pedigree of digital identities. Technology neutrality has bred a bewildering array of ad hoc authentication methods, including SMS messages, one time password generators, password calculators, grid cards and picture passwords; at the same time we've done nothing at all to inhibit the re-use of stolen IDs.
It's high time government and industry got working together on a uniform and universal set of smart identity tools to properly protect consumers online.
Stay tuned for more of my thoughts on identity safety, inspired by recent news that health identifiers may be back on the table in the gigantic U.S. e-health system. The security and privacy issues are large but the cyber safety technology is at hand!