Lockstep

Mobile: +61 (0) 414 488 851
Email: swilson@lockstep.com.au

Weak links in the Blockchain

One of the silliest things I've read yet about blockchain came out in Business Insider Australia last week. They said that the blockchain “in effect” lets the crowd police the monetary system.

In the rush to make bigger and grander claims for the disruptive potential of blockchain, too many commentators are neglecting the foundations. If they think blockchain is important, then it’s all the more important they understand what it does well, and what it just doesn’t do at all.

Blockchain has one very clever, very innovative trick: it polices the order of special events (namely Bitcoin spends) without needing a central authority. The main “security” that blockchain provides is nottamper resistance or inviolability per se -- you can get that any number of ways using standard cryptography -- but rather it’s the process for a big network of nodes to reach agreement on the state of a distributed ledger, especially the order of updates to the ledger.

To say blockchain is “more secure” is a non sequitur. Security claims need context.

  • If what matters is agreeing ‘democratically’ on the order of events in a decentralised public ledger, without any central authority, then blockchain makes sense.
  • But if you don't care about the order of events, then blockchain is probably irrelevant or, at best, heavily over-engineered.
  • And if you do care about the order of events (like stock transactions) but you have some central authority in your system (like a stock exchange), then blockchain is not only over-engineered, but its much-admired maths is compromised by efforts to scale it down, into private chains and the like, for the power of the original blockchain consensus algorithm lies in its vast network, and the Bitcoin rewards for the miners that power it.

A great thing about blockchain is the innovation it has inspired. But let’s remember that the blockchain (the one underpinning Bitcoin) has been around for just seven years, and its spinoffs are barely out of the lab. Analysts and journalists are bound to be burnt if they over-reach at this early stage.

The initiatives to build smaller, private or special purpose distributed ledgers, to get away from Bitcoin and payments, detract from the original innovation, in two important ways. Firstly, even if they replace the Bitcoin incentive for running the network (i.e. mining or “proof of work”) with some other economic model (like “proof of stake”), they compromise the tamper resistance of blockchain by shrinking the pool. And secondly, as soon as you fold some command and control back into the original utopia, blockchain’s raison d'etre is no longer clear, and its construction looks over-engineered.

Business journalists are supposed to be sceptical about technology, but many have apparently taken leave of their critical faculties, even talking up blockchain as a "trust machine". You don’t need to be a cryptographer to understand the essence of blockchain, you just have to be cautious with magic words like “open” and “decentralised”, and the old saw "trust". What do they really mean? Blockchain does things that not all applications really need, and it doesn't do what many apps do need, like access control and confidentiality.

Didn't we learn from PKI that technology doesn't confer trust? It's been claimed that putting land titles on the blockchain will prevent government corruption. To which I say, please heed Bruce Schneier, who said only amateurs hack computers; professional criminals hack people.

Posted in Trust, Security, Payments, Innovation

A brush with fame (not)

Wired thinks it has unmasked Bitcoin inventor Satoshi Nakamoto as an Australian security personality Craig Wright. Plenty of others beg to differ.

Curiously, I had an ugly argument with Wright and a handful of Bitcoin enthusiasts on Twitter in May 2015.

It started after I asked a simple question about why some people had started advocating blockchain for identity. I didn't get a straight answer, but instead copped a fair bit of abuse. Wright's Twitter account has since been deleted, so it's hard to reconstruct the thread (I'd love it if someone out there knows how to extract a more complete Twitter archive; I don't suppose anyone Storified the thread?).

Reproduced below is one side of the spat. I only have my own archived tweets from the time in question but you should get the gist. Wright could never stick to the point - what does blockchain have to offer identity management? Instead he took all inquiries as an attack. He's passionate about Bitcoin changing the world, and if I recall correctly, boasted of his own enormous wealth from Bitcoin mining (he's no crypto-anarchist, as is clear from his exhorbitant LinkedIn profile, one of the longest you'll ever see). Wright's arguments were all deflections; he even dredged up a PKI project from 17 years ago on which we worked together, where evidently he and I had some difference of opinion, something I honestly can't remember.

10/05/2015 3:32 Blockchain-for-identity proponents: Please set out the problem to be solved, analyse it, state your proposal, and argue its benefits.
11/05/2015 22:52 .@caelyxsec: "Bitcoin is just soft certs" @matthewsinclair < Classic!
11/05/2015 22:56 .@matthewsinclair @caelyxsec "Passport", "no central authority", "no walled gardens". Same old utopian slogans. Plus blockmagic.
11/05/2015 22:57 What does a Onelogin actually mean? It's a nickname. Who vouches for it? @matthewsinclair @caelyxsec
11/05/2015 23:09 .@matthewsinclair: @caelyxsec "what does having my Twitter & GitHub usernames signed into the blockchain actually mean?"; Not much.
15/05/2015 8:20 Seems to be a first-come-first-served nickname and self-certified details saved to the #blockchain. @paulmadsen @iglazer @TechPolicy
15/05/2015 8:24 .@Chris_Skinner "Repeat after me: Bitcoin Bad, Blockchain Good"; But good for what? Time stamped archive.
15/05/2015 9:27 .@craigvallis @paulmadsen @iglazer Very little! I don't see identity specialists advocating #blockchain for pressing identity problems
15/05/2015 10:28 RT @craigvallis: @Steve_Lockstep @paulmadsen @iglazer Heard the same from BitCoin specialists, without the coin blockchain is just a database
15/05/2015 10:31 .@craigvallis Clever contribution of #blockchain is to solve the double spend problem. But not a problem in identity @paulmadsen @iglazer
15/05/2015 21:26 .@Chris_Skinner Sure, I get Bitcoin for some payments, but I don't get #blockchain for anything else.
15/05/2015 22:15 .@Chris_Skinner Nope. Blockchain special properties relate to stopping double spend. I don't see the advantages for eg contract exchange
15/05/2015 22:21 1/2 - Thesis: #blockchain is a bit magical, so some guess it must have potential beyond payments - like identity. We need rigor here
15/05/2015 22:23 2/2 - I liken this to the way some are enamored with Quantum Mechanics to explain eg consciousness. Even magic has limits.
15/05/2015 23:16 Turns out BTC is hard to sustain even for payments. But for non-payments, is there any business model at all? https://t.co/69eHD9ssFi
15/05/2015 23:36 .@Dr_Craig_Wright Actually I always proposed community based PKI http://t.co/DagiIx74la (2003) http://t.co/o6aYQWvqMA (2008). Going strong
15/05/2015 23:40 .@Dr_Craig_Wright There's not much to attack. I still can't find a rigorous explanation of blockchain for identity.
16/05/2015 1:01 .@Dr_Craig_Wright So most people are just guessing that blockchain has potential for identity.
16/05/2015 1:09 .@Dr_Craig_Wright But maybe you can point me to one those many sources to explain the potential of blockchain or whatever for identity?
16/05/2015 1:23 .@BitcoinBelle Please explain what blockchain does that a digital signature chained to eg a bank does not? @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 1:27 @Dr_Craig_Wright @BitcoinBelle @Chris_Skinner Explanations please, not abuse.
16/05/2015 1:29 .@BitcoinBelle I get BTC for the unbanked. I do. But I don't get contracts or patents in that setting. @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 1:32 @BitcoinBelle Can you follow a thread? Or a line of logic?
16/05/2015 1:34 .@BitcoinBelle So once again, explain please how a timestamp plus tamper resistance is special? @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 1:42 1/4: @benmcginnes Proof of what? Someone unilaterally asserted something about themselves? @BitcoinBelle @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 1:43 2/4: "Proof" to what standard? That word implies accreditation somewhere. @benmcginnes @BitcoinBelle @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 1:44 3/4: Who relies on the proof? ie what's the detailed use case? @benmcginnes @BitcoinBelle @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 1:47 4/4: Why/how does interfacing to blockchain give better proof than a PK cert? @benmcginnes @BitcoinBelle @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 2:40 .@benmcginnes Math proof in identity is the easy bit. Proof of attributes and rel'ships matters more. @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 2:43 .@benmcginnes Oh please. That's why I'm asking people to compare 2 types: blockchain and PK certs. @Chris_Skinner @Dr_Craig_Wright
16/05/2015 2:46 .@Dr_Craig_Wright I mean accred in the broadest sense: a disinterested endorsement. Self asserted means 0 @benmcginnes @Chris_Skinner
16/05/2015 3:18 .@Dr_Craig_Wright Something I said in a PKI advisory 17 years seems to still be eating you Craig. What is it? @benmcginnes
16/05/2015 5:12 .@BitcoinBelle But. Why. Bother? What's better about blockchain, compared with putting your hysterics on Twitter? @el33th4xor
16/05/2015 5:16 So I asked for an explanation of #blockchain for identity. And all I get is hippy nonsense - it's not central, not fiat, not govt.
16/05/2015 8:35 @futureidentity It's certainly the case with Bitcoin that it's more about the people than the technology.
16/05/2015 10:26 @jonmatonis @futureidentity Thanks but sorry, what do you mean by user defined privacy?
16/05/2015 10:27 @jonmatonis @futureidentity Please explain deniability of ownership.
16/05/2015 11:06 .@jonmatonis Thanks. How is that realized with blockchain where all transactions are available for all to see? @futureidentity
16/05/2015 12:10 .@benmcginnes I don't need visuals. I need blockchain-for-identity pundits to set out the problem it solves. @jonmatonis @futureidentity
16/05/2015 19:52 Twitter: Where you can be sure to find all the answers to questions you never asked.
16/05/2015 19:57 .@adam3us But why #blockchain? It was designed to stop double spend. Cheaper ways to hold immutable attributes @jonmatonis @futureidentity
16/05/2015 20:04 RT @adam3us: .@Steve_Lockstep @jonmatonis @futureidentity Well indeed identity does not belong on chain. Payment protocol is offchain
16/05/2015 20:09 .@cdelargy Which id mgt action corresponds to spending? Is it each presentation of "I am Steve"? @adam3us @jonmatonis @futureidentity
16/05/2015 20:18 .@jonmatonis Which is to say identity is not the new form of currency? .@futureidentity
16/05/2015 20:21 .@adam3us Auxillary info meaning the attributes and most importantly who vouches for them? @cdelargy @jonmatonis @futureidentity
16/05/2015 22:00 RT @adam3us: .@Steve_Lockstep @cdelargy @jonmatonis @futureidentity Yes Blockchain hasn't bandwidth for finance app msgs with identity
16/05/2015 22:26 .@Beautyon_ Not at all. I've articulated how I see the main id problem to solve: http://t.co/LPXBHieawT I ask others do the same
16/05/2015 22:31 .@Beautyon_ I'm not anti Bitcoin. I'm pro rigor. Almost nobody weighing in articulates the IDAM problem blockchain supposedly fixes
16/05/2015 22:33 .@Beautyon_ I think I agree. Names per se are not as important as the more general "Here's an attribute about me you can rely on"
16/05/2015 22:36 .@Beautyon_ So I say we need IDAM system to imbue attributes with pedigree and present them so RPs r assured of pedigree and user control
16/05/2015 22:38 .@Beautyon_ If blockchain is involved in every attribute presentation, is bandwidth ok? And isn't the 10 minute reconciliation too long?
16/05/2015 22:40 .@Beautyon_ No, I frame identity as "what do I need to know about you to be able to deal with you?" in a context.
16/05/2015 22:47 .@Beautyon_ In the lingo of IDAM, the holder of the asset you want to access is the Relying Party. They rely on your credential or key.
16/05/2015 23:03 @Beautyon_ No I don't use GPG. Maybe I might still understand if someone offers an explanation.
16/05/2015 23:08 .@Beautyon_ Why the elitism? Why can't blockchain enthusiasts explain themselves to the unwashed? You're like Freemasons
16/05/2015 23:17 .@Beautyon_ 20 years in PKI. I think I got the basics. And an allergy to people who can't explain their craft in natural language.
17/05/2015 3:42 .@WulfKhan IDAM is complicated. Many facets. Many problems. Which are addressed by blockchain? I am not on about BTC. @Beautyon_
17/05/2015 4:22 .@Beautyon_ I advise organisations on non trivial authentication and privacy problems. DIY secrecy is not important in my world.
17/05/2015 4:35 User pseudonymity is a crude fragile measure. Privacy != secrecy. It's about what others do with info about you. https://t.co/VpiKWHTLBH

For what it's worth, in my wildest dreams I can't imagine the confusing, self-important Craig Wright being Nakamoto.

Posted in Security

The Economist's take on blockchain

An unpublished letter to the editor of The Economist.

November 1, 2015

Just as generalists mesmerized by quantum physics are prone to misapply it to broader but unrelated problems, some are making exorbitant claims for the potential of blockchain to change the world ("The trust machine", The Economist, October 31st). Yes, blockchain is extraordinarily clever but it was designed specifically to stop electronic cash from being double spent, without needing central oversight. As a general ledger, blockchain is unwieldy and expensive.

Trust online is all about provenance. How can I be sure a stranger’s claimed attributes, credentials and possessions are genuine? Proving a credit card number, employment status, or ownership of a block of land in a ‘democratic’ peer-to-peer mesh strikes some as utopian, but really it’s oxymoronic. The blockchain is an indelible record of claims, which still need to be vouched for before they are carved forever into mathematical stone.

Steve Wilson
Principal Analyst - Identity & Privacy, Constellation Research.

Posted in Innovation, Security, Trust

Satya Nadella at the security poker table

This morning Microsoft's CEO Satya Nadella gave a global speech about enterprise security. He announced a new Cyber Defense Operations Center, a should-not-be-new Microsoft Enterprise Cybersecurity Group and a not-at-all-new-sounding Enterprise Mobility Suite (EMS). The webcast can be replayed here but don't expect to be blown away. It's all just tablestakes for a global cloud provider.

Security is being standardised all over the place now. Ordinary people are getting savier about security best practice; they know for example that biometrics templates need to be handled carefully in client devices, and that secure storage is critical for assets like identities and Bitcoin. "Secure Element" is almost a lay-person's term now (Apple tried to give the iPhone security chip the fancy name "Enclave" but seem to now regard it as so standard it doesn't need branding).

All this awareness is great, but it's fast becoming hygeine. Like airplane safety. It's a bit strange for corporations to seek to compete on security, or to have the CEO announce what are really textbook security services. At the end of the speech, I couldn't tell if anything sets Microsoft apart from its arch competitors Google or Amazon.

Most of today's CISOs operate at a higher, more strategic level than malware screening, anti-virus and encryption. Nadella's subject matter was really deep in the plumbing. Not that there's anything wrong with that. But it just didn't seem to me like the subject matter for a CEO's global webcast.

The Microsoft "operational security posture" is very orthodox, resting on "Platform, Intelligence and Partners". I didn't see anything new here, just a big strong cloud provider doing exactly what they should: leveraging the hell out of a massive operation, with massive resources, and massive influence.

Posted in Security, Cloud

An identity glut on the Internet of Things

The identerati sometimes refer to the challenge of “binding carbon to silicon”. That’s a poetic way of describing how the field of Identity and Access Management (IDAM) is concerned with associating carbon-based life forms (as geeks fondly refer to people) with computers (or silicon chips).

To securely bind users’ identities or attributes to their computerised activities is indeed a technical challenge. In most conventional IDAM systems, there is only circumstantial evidence of who did what and when, in the form of access logs and audit trails, most of which can be tampered with or counterfeited by a sufficiently determined fraudster. To create a lasting, tamper-resistant impression of what people do online requires some sophisticated technology (in particular, digital signatures created using hardware-based cryptography).

On the other hand, working out looser associations between people and computers is the stock-in-trade of social networking operators and Big Data analysts. So many signals are emitted as a side effect of routine information processing today that even the shyest of users may be uncovered by third parties with sufficient analytics know-how and access to data.

So privacy is in peril. For the past two years, big data breaches have only got bigger: witness the losses at Target (110 million), EBay (145 million), Home Depot (109 million records) and JPMorgan Chase (83 million) to name a few. Breaches have got deeper, too. Most notably, in June 2015 the U.S. federal government’s Office of Personnel Management (OPM) revealed it had been hacked, with the loss of detailed background profiles on 15 million past and present employees.

I see a terrible systemic weakness in the standard practice of information security. Look at the OPM breach: what was going on that led to application forms for employees dating back 15 years remaining in a database accessible from the Internet? What was the real need for this availability? Instead of relying on firewalls and access policies to protect valuable data from attack, enterprises need to review which data needs to be online at all.

We urgently need to reduce the exposed attack surface of our information assets. But in the information age, the default has become to make data as available as possible. This liberality is driven both by the convenience of having all possible data on hand, just in case in it might be handy one day, and by the plummeting cost of mass storage. But it's also the result of a technocratic culture that knows "knowledge is power," and gorges on data.

In communications theory, Metcalfe’s Law states that the value of a network is proportional to the square of the number of devices that are connected. This is an objective mathematical reality, but technocrats have transformed it into a moral imperative. Many think it axiomatic that good things come automatically from inter-connection and information sharing; that is, the more connection the better. Openness is an unexamined rallying call for both technology and society. “Publicness” advocate Jeff Jarvis wrote (admittedly provocatively) that: “The more public society is, the safer it is”. And so a sort of forced promiscuity is shaping up as the norm on the Internet of Things. We can call it "superconnectivity", with a nod to the special state of matter where electrical resistance drops to zero.

In thinking about privacy on the IoT, a key question is this: how much of the data emitted from Internet-enabled devices will actually be personal data? If great care is not taken in the design of these systems, the unfortunate answer will be most of it.

Steve Wilson CISID15 Rationing Identity in IoT (0 4) HANDOUTS  Data flows in Internet of Cars
Steve Wilson CISID15 Rationing Identity in IoT (0 4 1) HANDOUTS  Imposing order IoT PII flows

My latest investigation into IoT privacy uses the example of the Internet connected motor car. "Rationing Identity on the Internet of Things" will be released soon by Constellation Research.

And don't forget Constellation's annual innovation summit, Connected Enterprise at Half Moon Bay outside San Francisco, November 4th-6th. Early bird registration closes soon.

Posted in Security, Privacy, Cloud, Big Data

Good, better, BlackBerry

In the latest course of a 15 month security feast, BlackBerry has announced it is acquiring mobile device management (MDM) provider Good Technology. The deal is said to be definitive, for US$425 million in cash.

As BlackBerry boldly re-positions itself as a managed service play in the Internet of Things, adding an established MDM capability to its portfolio will bolster its claim -- which still surprises many -- to be handset neutral. But the Good buy is much more than that. It has to be seen in the context of John Chen's drive for cross-sector security and privacy infrastructure for the IoT.

As I reported from the recent BlackBerry Security Summit in New York, the company has knitted together a comprehensive IoT security fabric. Look at how they paint their security platform:

BBY Security Platform In Action

And see how Good will slip neatly into the Platform Services column. It's the latest in what is now a $575 million investment in non-organic security growth (following purchases of Secusmart, Watchdox, Movirtu and Athoc).

According to BlackBerry,

    • Good will bring complementary capabilities and technologies to BlackBerry, including secure applications and containerization that protects end user privacy. With Good, BlackBerry will expand its ability to offer cross-platform EMM solutions that are critical in a world with varying deployment models such as bring-your-own-device (BYOD); corporate owned, personally enabled (COPE); as well as environments with multiple user interfaces and operating systems. Good has expertise in multi-OS management with 64 percent of activations from iOS devices, followed by a broad Android and Windows customer base.(1) This experience combined with BlackBerry’s strength in BlackBerry 10 and Android management – including Samsung KNOX-enabled devices – will provide customers with increased choice for securely deploying any leading operating system in their organization.

MyPOV

The strategic acquisition of Good Technology will also give the Identity-as-a-Service sector a big kick. IDaaS is become a crowded space with at least ten vendors (CA, Centrify, IBM, Microsoft, Okta, OneLogin, Ping, Salepoint, Salesforce, VMware) competing strongly around a pretty well settled set of features and functions. BlackBerry themselves launched an IDaaS a few months ago. At the Security Summit, I asked their COO Marty Beard what is going to distinguishe their offering in such a tight market, and he said, simply, mobility. Presto!

But IDaaS is set to pivot. We all know that mobility is now the locus of security , and we've seen VMware parlay its AirWatch investment into a competitive new cloud identity service. This must be more than a catch-up play with so many entrenched IDaaS vendors.

Here's the thing. I foresee identity actually disappearing from the user experience, which more and more will just be about the apps. I discussed this development in a really fun "Identity Innovators" video interview recorded with Ping at the recent Cloud Identity Summit. For identity to become seamless with the mobile application UX, we need two things. Firstly, federation protocols so that different pieces of software can hand over attributes and authentication signals to one another, and these are all in place now. But secondly we also need fully automated mobile device management as a service, and that's where Good truly fits with the growing BlackBerry platform.

Now stay tuned for new research coming soon via Constellation on the Internet of Things, identity, privacy and software reliability.

See also The State of Identity Management in 2015.

Posted in Security, Identity, Federated Identity, Constellation Research, Big Data

Card Not Present fraud trends (sadly) back to normal

The Australian Payments Clearing Association (APCA) releases card fraud statistics every six months for the preceding 12m period. For years, Lockstep has been monitoring these figures, plotting the trend data and analysing what the industry is and is not doing about it. A few weeks ago, statistics for calendar year 2014 came out.

CNP trends pic to CY 2014

As we reported last time, despite APCA's optimistic boosting of 3D Secure and education measures for many years, Card Not Present (CNP) online fraud was not falling as hoped. And what we see now in the latest numbers is the second biggest jump in CNP fraud ever! CY 2014 online card fraud losses were very nearly AU$300M, up 42% in 12 months.

Again, APCA steadfastly rationalises in its press release (PDF) that high losses simply reflect the popularity of online shopping. That's cold comfort to the card holders and merchants who are affected.

APCA has a love-ignore relationship with 3D Secure. This is one of the years when 3D Secure goes unmentioned. Instead the APCA presser talks up tokenization, I think for the first time. Yet the payments industry has had tokenization for about a decade. It's just another band-aid over the one fundamental crack in the payment card system: nothing stops stolen card numbers being replayed.

A proper fix to replay attack is easily within reach, which would re-use the same cryptography that solves skimming and carding, and would restore a seamless payment experience for card holders. See my 2012 paper Calling for a Uniform Approach to Card Fraud Offline and On" (PDF).

Abstract

The credit card payments system is a paragon of standardisation. No other industry has such a strong history of driving and adopting uniform technologies, infrastructure and business processes. No matter where you keep a bank account, you can use a globally branded credit card to go shopping in almost every corner of the world. The universal Four Party settlement model, and a long-standing card standard that works the same with ATMs and merchant terminals everywhere underpin seamless convenience. So with this determination to facilitate trustworthy and supremely convenient spending in every corner of the earth, it’s astonishing that the industry is still yet to standardise Internet payments. We settled on the EMV standard for in-store transactions, but online we use a wide range of confusing and largely ineffective security measures. As a result, Card Not Present (CNP) fraud is growing unchecked.

This article argues that all card payments should be properly secured using standardised hardware. In particular, CNP transactions should use the very same EMV chip and cryptography as do card present payments.

With all the innovation in payments leveraging cryptographic Secure Elements in mobile phones - the exemplar being Apple Pay for Card Present business - it beggars belief that we have yet to modernise CNP payments for web and mobile shopping.

Posted in Security, Payments, Fraud

BlackBerry Security Summit 2015

On July 23, BlackBerry hosted its second annual Security Summit, once again in New York City. As with last year’s event, this was a relatively intimate gathering of analysts and IT journalists, brought together for the lowdown on BlackBerry’s security and privacy vision.

By his own account, CEO John Chen has met plenty of scepticism over his diverse and, some say, chaotic product and services portfolio. And yet it’s beginning to make sense. There is a strong credible thread running through Chen’s initiatives. It all has to do with the Internet of Things.

Disclosure: I traveled to the Blackberry Security Summit as a guest of Blackberry, which covered my transport and accommodation.

The Growth Continues

In 2014, John Chen opened the show with the announcement he was buying the German voice encryption firm Secusmart. That acquisition appears to have gone well for all concerned; they say nobody has left the new organisation in the 12 months since. News of BlackBerry’s latest purchase - of crisis communications platform AtHoc - broke a few days before this year’s Summit, and it was only the most recent addition to the family. In the past 12 months, BlackBerry has been busy spending $150M on inorganic growth, picking up:

  • Secusmart - voice & message encryption (announced at the inaugural Security Summit 2014)
  • Movirtu - innovative virtual SIM solutions for holding multiple cell phone numbers on one chip
  • Watchdox - document security and rights management, for “data centric privacy”, and
  • Athoc (announced but not yet complete; see more details below).

    Chen has also overseen an additional $100M expenditure in the same timeframe on organic security expansion (over and above baseline product development). Amongst other things BlackBerry has:

  • "rekindled" Certicom, a specialist cryptography outfit acquired back in 2009 for its unique IP in elliptic curve encryption, and spun out a a new managed PKI service.
  • And it has created its own Enterprise Identity-as-a-Service (IDaas) solution. From what I saw at the Summit, BlackBerry is playing catch-up in cloud based IDAM but they do have an edge in mobility over the specialist identity vendors in what is now a crowded identity services marketplace.

    The Growth Explained - Secure Mobile Communications

    Executives from different business units and different technology horizontals all organised their presentations around what is now a comprehensive security product and services matrix. It looks like this (before adding AtHoc):

    BBY Security Platform In Action

    BlackBerry is striving to lead in Secure Mobile Communications. In that context the highlights of the Security Summit for mine were as follows.

    The Internet of Things

    BlackBerry’s special play is in the Internet of Things. It’s the consistent theme that runs through all their security investments, because as COO Marty Beard says, IoT involves a lot more than machine-to-machine communications. It’s more about how to extract meaningful data from unbelievable numbers of devices, with security and privacy. That is, IoT for BlackBerry is really a security-as-a-service play.

    Chief Security Officer David Kleidermacher repeatedly stressed the looming challenge of “how to patch and upgrade devices at scale”.

      • MyPOV: Functional upgrades for smart devices will of course be part and parcel of IoT, but at the same time, we need to work much harder to significantly reduce the need for reactive security patches. I foresee an angry consumer revolt if things that never were computers start to behave and fail like computers. A radically higher standard of quality and reliability is required. Just look at the Jeep Uconnect debacle, where it appears Chrysler eventually thought better of foisting a patch on car owners and instead opted for a much more expensive vehicle recall. It was BlackBerry’s commitment to ultra high reliability software that really caught my attention at the 2014 Security Summit, and it convinces me they grasp what’s going to be required to make ubiquitous computing properly seamless.

    Refreshingly, COO Beard preferred to talk about economic value of the IoT, rather than the bazillions of devices we are all getting a little jaded about. He said the IoT would bring about $4 trillion of required technology within a decade, and that the global economic impact could be $11 trillion.

    BlackBerry’s real time operating system QNX is in 50 million cars today.

    AtHoc

    AtHoc is a secure crisis communications service, with its roots in the first responder environment. It’s used by three million U.S. government workers today, and the company is now pushing into healthcare.

    Founder and CEO Guy Miasnik explained that emergency communications involves more than just outbound alerts to people dealing with disasters. Critical to crisis management is the secure inbound collection of info from remote users. AtHoc is also not just about data transmission (as important as that is) but it works also at the application layer, enabling sophisticated workflow management. This allows procedures for example to be defined for certain events, guiding sets of users and devices through expected responses, escalating issues if things don’t get done as expected.

    “CHACE”

    We heard more about BlackBerry’s collaboration with Oxford University on the Centre for High Assurance Computing Excellence, first announced in April at the RSA Conference. CHACE is concerned with a range of fundamental topics, including formal methods for verifying program correctness (an objective that resonates with BlackBerry’s secure operating system division QNX) and new security certification methodologies, with technical approaches based on the Common Criteria of ISO 15408 but with more agile administration to reduce that standard’s overhead and infamous rigidity.

    CSO Kleidermacher announced that CHACE will work with the Diabetes Technology Society on a new healthcare security standards initiative. The need for improved medical device security was brought home vividly by an enthralling live demonstration of hacking a hospital drug infusion pump. These vulnerabilities have been exposed before at hacker conferences but BlackBerry’s demo was especially clear and informative, and crafted for a non-technical executive audience.

      • MyPOV: The message needs to be broadcast loud and clear: there are life-critical machines in widespread use, built on commercial computing platforms, without any careful thought for security. It’s a shameful and intolerable situation.

    Privacy

    I was impressed by BlackBerry’s privacy line. It's broader and more sophisticated than most security companies, going way beyond the obvious matters of encryption and VPNs. In particular, the firm champions identity plurality. For instance, WorkLife by BlackBerry, powered by Movirtu technology, realizes multiple identities on a single phone. BlackBerry is promoting this capability in the health sector especially, where there is rarely a clean separation of work and life for professionals. Chen said he wants to “separate work and private life”.

    The health sector in general is one of the company’s two biggest business development priorities (the other being automotive). In addition to sophisticated telephony like virtual SIMs, they plan to extend extend AtHoc into healthcare messaging, and have tasked the CHACE think-tank with medical device security. These actions complement BlackBerry’s fine words about privacy.

    Conclusion

    So BlackBerry’s acquisition plan has gelled. It now has perhaps the best secure real time OS for smart devices, a hardened device-independent Mobile Device Management backbone, new data-centric privacy and rights management technology, remote certificate management, and multi-layered emergency communications services that can be diffused into mission-critical rules-based e-health settings and, eventually, automated M2M messaging. It’s a powerful portfolio that makes strong sense in the Internet of Things.

    BlackBerry says IoT is 'much more than device-to-device'. It’s more important to be able to manage secure data being ejected from ubiquitous devices in enormous volumes, and to service those things – and their users – seamlessly. For BlackBerry, the Internet of Things is really all about the service.

    Posted in Software engineering, Security, Privacy, PKI, e-health, Constellation Research, Cloud, Big Data

  • Breaking down digital identity

    Identity online is a vexed problem. The majority of Internet fraud today can be related to weaknesses in the way we authenticate people electronically. Internet identity is terribly awkward too. Unfortunately today we still use password techniques dating back to 1960s mainframes that were designed for technicians, by technicians.

    Our identity management problems also stem from over-reach. For one thing, the information era heralded new ways to reach and connect with people, with almost no friction. We may have taken too literally the old saw “information wants to be free.” Further, traditional ways of telling who people are, through documents and “old boys networks” creates barriers, which are anathema to new school Internet thinkers.

    For the past 10-to-15 years, a heady mix of ambitions has informed identity management theory and practice: improve usability, improve security and improve “trust.” Without ever pausing to unravel the rainbow, the identity and access management industry has created grandiose visions of global “trust frameworks” to underpin a utopia of seamless stranger-to-stranger business and life online.

    Well-resourced industry consortia and private-public partnerships have come and gone over the past decade or more. Numerous “trust” start-up businesses have launched and failed. Countless new identity gadgets, cryptographic algorithms and payment schemes have been tried.

    And yet the identity problem is still with us. Why is identity online so strangely resistant to these well-meaning efforts to fix it? In particular, why is federated identity so dramatically easier said than done?

    Identification is a part of risk management. In business, service providers use identity to manage the risk that they might be dealing with the wrong person. Different transactions carry different risks, and identification standards are varied accordingly. Conversely, if a provider cannot be sure enough who someone is, they now have the tools to withhold or limit their services. For example, when an Internet customer signs in from an unusual location, payment processors can put a cap on the dollar amounts they will authorize.

    Across our social and business walks of life, we have distinct ways of knowing people, which yields a rich array of identities by which we know and show who we are to others. These Identities have evolved over time to suit different purposes. Different relationships rest on different particulars, and so identities naturally become specific not general.

    The human experience of identity is one of ambiguity and contradictions. Each of us simultaneously holds a weird and wonderful ensemble of personal, family, professional and social identities. Each is different, sometimes radically so. Some of us lead quite secret lives, and I’m not thinking of anything salacious, but maybe just the role-playing games that provide important escapes from the humdrum.

    Most of us know how it feels when identities collide. There’s no better example than what I call the High School Reunion Effect: that strange dislocation you feel when you see acquaintances for the first time in decades. You’ve all moved on, you’ve adopted new personae in new contexts – not the least of which is the one defined by a spouse and your own new family. Yet you find yourself re-winding past identities, relating to your past contemporaries as you all once were, because it was those school relationships, now fossilised, that defined you.

    Frankly, we’ve made a mess of the pivotal analogue-to-digital conversion of identity. In real life we know identity is malleable and relative, yet online we’ve rendered it crystalline and fragile.
    We’ve come close to the necessary conceptual clarity. Some 10 years ago a network of “identerati” led by Kim Cameron of Microsoft composed the “Laws of Identity,” which contained a powerful formulation of the problem to be addressed. The Laws defined Digital Identity as “a set of claims made [about] a digital subject.”

    Your Digital Identity is a proxy for a relationship, pointing to a suite of particulars that matter about you in a certain context. When you apply for a bank account, when you subsequently log on to Internet banking, when you log on to your work extranet, or to Amazon or PayPal or Twitter, or if you want to access your electronic health record, the relevant personal details are different each time.
    The flip side of identity management is privacy. If authentication concerns what a Relying Party needs to know about you, then privacy is all about what they don’t need to know. Privacy amounts to information minimization; security professionals know this all too well as the “Need to Know” principle.

    All attempts at grand global identities to date have failed. The Big Certification Authorities of the 1990s reckoned a single, all-purpose digital certificate would meet the needs of all business, but they were wrong. Ever more sophisticated efforts since then have also failed, such as the Infocard Foundation, Liberty Alliance and the Australian banking sector’s Trust Centre.

    Significantly, federation for non-trivial identities only works within regulatory monocultures – for example the US Federal Bridge CA, or the Scandinavian BankID network – where special legislation authorises banks and governments to identify customers by the one credential. The current National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace has pondered legislation to manage liability but has balked. The regulatory elephant remains in the room.

    As an aside, obviously social identities like Facebook and Twitter handles federate very nicely, but these are issued by organisations that don't really know who we are, and they're used by web sites that don't really care who we are; social identity federation is a poor model for serious identity management.

    A promising identity development today is the Open Identity Foundation’s Attribute Exchange Network, a new architecture seeking to organise how identity claims may be traded. The Attribute Exchange Network resonates with a growing realization that, in the words of Andrew Nash, a past identity lead at Google and at PayPal, “attributes are at least as interesting as identities – if not more so.”

    If we drop down a level and deal with concrete attribute data instead of abstract identities, we will start to make progress on the practical challenges in authentication: better resistance to fraud and account takeover, easier account origination and better privacy.

    My vision is that by 2019 we will have a fresh marketplace of Attribute Providers. The notion of “Identity Provider” should die off, for identity is always in the eye of the Relying Party. What we need online is an array of respected authorities and agents that can vouch for our particulars. Banks can provide reliable electronic proof of our payment card numbers; government agencies can attest to our age and biographical details; and a range of private businesses can stand behind attributes like customer IDs, membership numbers and our retail reputations.

    In five years time I expect we will adopt a much more precise language to describe how to deal with people online, and it will reflect more faithfully how we’ve transacted throughout history. As the old Italian proverb goes: It is nice to “trust” but it’s better not to.

    This article first appeared as "Abandoning identity in favor of attributes" in Secure ID News, 2 December, 2014.

    Posted in Trust, Social Networking, Security, Identity, Federated Identity

    Once more to the breach!

    Bank robber Willie Sutton, when asked why he robbed banks, answered "That's where the money is". It's the same with breaches. Large databases are the targets of people who want data. It's that simple.

    Having said that, there are different sorts of breaches and corresponding causes. Most high profile breaches are obviously driven by financial crime, where attackers typically grab payment card details. Breaches are what powers most card fraud. Organised crime gangs don't pilfer card numbers one at a time from people's computers or insecure websites (and so the standard advice to consumers to change their passwords every month and to make sure they see a browser padlock is nice but don't think it will do anything to stop mass card fraud).

    Instead of blaming end user failings, we need to really turn up the heat on enterprise IT. The personal data held by big merchant organisations (including even mundane operations like car parking chains) is now worth many hundreds of millions of dollars. If this kind of value was in the form of cash or gold, you'd see Fort Knox-style security around it. Literally. But how much money does even the biggest enterprise invest in security? And what do they get for their money?

    The grim reality is that no amount of conventional IT security today can prevent attacks on assets worth billions of dollars. The simple economics is against us. It's really more a matter of luck than good planning that some large organisations have yet to be breached (and that's only so far as we know).

    Organised crime is truly organised. If it's card details they want, they go after the big data stores, at payments processors and large retailers. The sophistication of these attacks is amazing even to security pros. The attack on Target's Point of Sale terminals for instance was in the "can't happen" category.

    The other types of criminal breach include mischief, as when the iCloud photos of celebrities were leaked last year, hacktivism, and political or cyber terrorist attacks, like the one on Sony.

    There's some evidence that identity thieves are turning now to health data to power more complex forms of crime. Instead of stealing and replaying card numbers, identity thieves can use deeper, broader information like patient records to either commit fraud against health system payers, or to open bogus accounts and build them up into complex scams. The recent Anthem database breach involved extensive personal records on 80 million individuals; we have yet to see how these details will surface in the identity black markets.

    The ready availability of stolen personal data is one factor we find to be driving Identity and Access Management (IDAM) innovation; see "The State of Identity Management in 2015". Next generation IDAM will eventually make stolen data less valuable, but for the foreseeable future, all enterprises holding large customer datasets we will remain prime targets for identity thieves.

    Now let's not forget simple accidents. The Australian government for example has had some clangers though these can happen to any big organisation. A few months ago a staffer accidentally attached the wrong a file to an email, and thus released the passport details of the G20 leaders. Before that, we saw a spreadsheet holding personal details of thousands of asylum seekers get mistakenly pasted into a government website HTML.

    A lesson I want to bring out here is the terrible complexity and fragility of our IT systems. It doesn't take much for human error to have catastrophic results. Who among us has not accidentally hit 'Reply All' or attached the wrong file to an email? If you did an honest Threat & Risk Assessment on these sorts of everyday office systems, you'd have to conclude they are not safe to handle sensitive data nor to be operated by most human beings. But of course we simply can't afford notto use office IT. We've created a monster.

    Again, criminal elements know this. The expert cryptographer Bruce Schneier once said "amateurs hack systems, professionals hack people". Access control on today's sprawling complex computer systems is generally poor, leaving the way open for inside jobs. Just look at the Chelsea Manning case, one of the worst breaches of all time, made possible by granting too high access privileges to too many staffers.

    Outside government, access control is worse, and so is access logging - so system administrators often can't tell there's even been a breach until circumstantial evidence emerges. I am sure the majority of breaches are occurring without anyone knowing. It's simply inevitable.

    Look at hotels. There are occasional reports of hotel IT breaches, but they are surely happening continuously. The guest details held in hotels is staggering - payment card details, license plates, travel itineraries including airline flight details, even passport numbers are held by some places. And these days, with global hotel chains, the whole booking database is available to a rogue employee from any place in the world, 24-7.

    Please, don't anyone talk to me about PCI-DSS! The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards for protecting cardholder details haven't had much effect at all. Some of the biggest breaches of all time have affected top tier merchants and payments processors which appear to have been PCI compliant. Yet the lawyers for the payments institutions will always argue that such-and-such a company wasn't "really" compliant. And the PCI auditors walk away from any liability for what happens in between audits. You can understand their position; they don't want to be accountable for wrong doings or errors committed behind their backs. However, cardholders and merchants are caught in the middle. If a big department store passes its PCI audits, surely we can expect them to be reasonably secure year-long? No, it turns out that the day after a successful audit, an IT intern can mis-configure a firewall or forget a patch; all those defences become useless, and the audit is rendered meaningless.

    Which reinforces my point about the fragility of IT: it's impossible to make lasting security promises anymore.

    In any case, PCI is really just a set of data handling policies and promises. They improve IT security hygiene, and ward off amateur attacks. But they are useless against organised crime or inside jobs.

    There is an increasingly good argument to outsource data management. Rather than maintain brittle databases in the face of so much risk, companies are instead turning to large reputable cloud services, where the providers have the scale, resources and attention to detail to protect data in their custody. I previously looked at what matters in choosing cloud services from a geographical perspective in my Constellation Research report "Why Cloud Geography Matters in a Post-Snowden/NSA Era". And in forthcoming research I'll examine a broader set of contract-related KPIs to help buyers make the right choice of cloud service provider.

    If you asked me what to do about data breaches, I'd say the short-to-medium term solution is to get with the strength and look for managed security services from specialist providers. In the longer term, we will have to see grassroots re-engineering of our networks and platforms, to harden them against penetration, and to lessen the opportunity for identity theft.

    In the meantime, you can hope for the best, if you plan for the worst.

    Actually, no, you can't hope.

    Posted in Constellation Research, Security