The Australian government's new Digital Transformation Office (DTO) is a welcome initiative, and builds on a generally strong e-government program of many years standing.
But I'm a little anxious about one plank of the DTO mission: the development of a "Trusted Digital Identity Framework".
We've had several attempts at this sort of thing over many years, and we really need a fresh approach next time around.
I hope we don't re-hash the same old hopes for "trust" and "identity" as we have for over 15 years. The real issues can be expressed more precisely. How do we get reliable signals about the people and entities we're trying to deal with online? How do we equip individuals to be able to show relevant signals about themselves, sufficient to get something done online? What are the roles of governments and markets in all this?
Frankly, I loathe the term "Trust Framework"! Trust is hugely distracting if not irrelevant. And we already have frameworks in spades.
Ray Wang tells us now that writing a book and launching a company are incredibly fulfilling things to do - but ideally, not at the same time. He thought it would take a year to write "Disrupting Digital Business", but since it overlapped with building Constellation Research, it took three! But at the same time, his book is all the richer for that experience.
Ray is on a world-wide book tour (tweeting under the hash tag #cxotour). I was thrilled to participate in the Melbourne leg last week. We convened a dinner at Melbourne restaurant The Deck and were joined by a good cross section of Australian private and public sector businesses. There were current and recent executives from Energy Australia, Rio Tinto, the Victorian Government and Australia Post among others, plus the founders of several exciting local start-ups. And we were lucky to have special guests Brian Katz and Ben Robbins - two renowned mobility gurus.
The format for all the launch events has one or two topical short speeches from Constellation analysts and Associates, and a fireside chat by Ray. In Melbourne, we were joined by two of Australia's deep digital economy experts, Gavin Heaton and Joanne Jacobs. Gavin got us going on the night, surveying the importance of innovation, and the double edged opportunities and threats of digital disruption.
Then Ray spoke off-the-cuff about his book, summarising years of technology research and analysis, and the a great many cases of business disruption, old and new. Ray has an encyclopedic grasp of tech-driven successes and failures going back decades, yet his presentations are always up-to-the-minute and full of practical can-do calls to action. He's hugely engaging, and having him on a small stage for a change lets him have a real conversation with the audience.
Speaking with no notes and PowerPoint-free, Ray ranged across all sorts of disruptions in all sorts of sectors, including:
- Sony's double cassette Walkman (which Ray argues playfully was their "last innovation")
- Coca Cola going digital, and the speculative "ten cent sip"
- the real lesson of the iPhone: geeks spend time arguing about whether Apple's technology is original or appropriated, when the point is their phone disrupted 20 or more other business models
- the contrasting Boeing 787 Dreamliner and Airbus A380 mega jumbo - radically different ways to maximise the one thing that matters to airlines: dollars per passenger-miles, and
- Uber, which observers don't always fully comprehend as a rich mix of mobility, cloud and Big Data.
And I closed the scheduled part of the evening with a provocation on privacy. I asked the group to think about what it means to call any online business practice "creepy". Have community norms and standards really changed in the move online? What's worse: government surveillance for political ends, or private sector surveillance for profit? If we pay for free online services with our personal information, do regular consumers understand the bargain? And if cynics have been asking "Is Privacy Dead?" for over 100 years, doesn't it mean the question is purely rhetorical? Who amongst us truly wants privacy to be over?!
The discussion quickly attained a life of its own - muscular, but civilized. And it provided ample proof that whatever you think about privacy, it is complicated and surprising, and definitely disruptive! (For people who want to dig further into the paradoxes of modern digital privacy, Ray and I recently recorded a nice long chat about it).
Here are some of the Digital Disruption tour dates coming up:
In May 2014, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that under European law, people have the right to have certain information about them delisted from search engine results. The ECJ ruling was called the "Right to be Forgotten", despite it having little to do with forgetting (c'est la vie). Shortened as RTBF, it is also referred to more clinically as the "Right to be Delisted" (or simply as "Google Spain" because that was one of the parties in the court action). Within just a few months, the RTBF has triggered conferences, public debates, and a TEDx talk.
Google itself did two things very quickly in response to the RTBF ruling. First, it mobilised a major team to process delisting requests. This is no mean feat -- over 200,000 requests have been received to date; see Google's transparency report. However it's not surprising they got going so quickly as they already have well-practiced processes for take-down notices for copyright and unlawful material.
Secondly, the company convened an Advisory Council of independent experts to formulate strategies for balancing the competing rights and interests bound up in RTBF. The Advisory Council delivered its report in January; it's available online here.
I declare I'm a strong supporter of RTBF. I've written about it here and here, and participated in an IEEE online seminar. I was impressed by the intellectual and eclectic make-up of the Council, which includes a past European Justice Minister, law professors, and a philosopher. And I do appreciate that the issues are highly complex. So I had high expectations of the Council's report.
Yet I found it quite barren.
Recap - the basics of RTBF
EU Justice Commissioner Martine Reicherts in a speech last August gave a clear explanation of the scope of the ECJ ruling, and acknowledged its nuances. Her speech should be required reading. Reicherts summed up the situation thus:
- What did the Court actually say on the right to be forgotten? It said that individuals have the right to ask companies operating search engines to remove links with personal information about them – under certain conditions - when information is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, outdated or excessive for the purposes of data processing. The Court explicitly ruled that the right to be forgotten is not absolute, but that it will always need to be balanced against other fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of the media – which, by the way, are not absolute rights either.
Everyone concerned acknowledges there are tensions in the RTBF ruling. The Google Advisory Council Report mentions these tensions (in Section 3) but sadly spends no time critically exploring them. In truth, all privacy involves conflicting requirements, and to that extent, many features of RTBF have been seen before. At p5, the Report mentions that "the [RTBF] Ruling invokes a data subject’s right to object to, and require cessation of, the processing of data about himself or herself" (emphasis added); the reader may conclude, as I have, that the computing of search results by a search engine is just another form of data processing.
One of the most important RTBF talking points is whether it's fair that Google is made to adjudicate delisting requests. I have some sympathies for Google here, and yet this is not an entirely novel situation in privacy. A standard feature of international principles-based privacy regimes is the right of individuals to have erroneous personal data corrected (this is, for example, OECD Privacy Principle No. 7 - Individual Participation, and Australian Privacy Principle No. 13 - Correction of Personal Information). And at the top of p5, the Council Report cites the right to have errors rectified. So it is standard practice that a data custodian must have means for processing access and correction requests. Privacy regimes expect there to be dispute resolution mechanisms too, operated by the company concerned. None of this is new. What seems to be new to some stakeholders is the idea that the results of a search engine is just another type of data processing.
A little rushed
The Council explains in the Introduction to the Report that it had to work "on an accelerated timeline, given the urgency with which Google had to begin complying with the Ruling once handed down". I am afraid that the Report shows signs of being a little rushed.
- There are several spelling errors.
- The contributions from non English speakers could have done with some editing.
- Less trivially, many of the footnotes need editing; it's not always clear how a person's footnoted quote supports the text.
- More importantly, the Advisory Council surely operated with Terms of Reference, yet there is no clear explanation of what those were. At the end of the introduction, we're told the group was "convened to advise on criteria that Google should use in striking a balance, such as what role the data subject plays in public life, or whether the information is outdated or no longer relevant. We also considered the best process and inputs to Google’s decision making, including input from the original publishers of information at issue, as potentially important aspects of the balancing exercise." I'm surprised there is not a more complete and definitive description of the mission.
- It's not actually clear what sort of search we're all talking about. Not until p7 of the Report does the qualified phrase "name-based search" first appear. Are there other types of search for which the RTBF does not apply?
- Above all, it's not clear that the Council has reached a proper conclusion. The Report makes a number of suggestions in passing, and there is a collection of "ideas" at the back for improving the adjudication process, but there is no cogent set of recommendations. That may be because the Council didn't actually reach consensus.
And that's one of the most surprising things about the whole exercise. Of the eight independent Council members, five of them wrote "dissenting opinions". The work of an expert advisory committee is not normally framed as a court-like determination, from which members might dissent. And even if it was, to have the majority of members "dissent" casts doubt on the completeness or even the constitution of the process. Is there anything definite to be dissented from?
Jimmy Wales, the Wikipedia founder and chair, was especially strident in his individual views at the back of the Report. He referred to "publishers whose works are being suppressed" (p27 of the Report), and railed against the report itself, calling its recommendation "deeply flawed due to the law itself being deeply flawed". Can he mean the entire Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and European Convention on Human Rights? Perhaps Wales is the sort of person that denies there are any nuances in privacy, because "suppressed" is an exaggeration if we accept that RTBF doesn't cause anything to be forgotten. In my view, it poisons the entire effort when unqualified insults are allowed to be hurled at the law. If Wales thinks so little of the foundation of both the ECJ ruling and the Advisory Council, he might have declined to take part.
A little hollow
Strangely, the Council's Report is altogether silent on the nature of search. It's such a huge part of their business that I have to think the strength of Google's objection to RTBF is energised by some threat it perceives to its famously secret algorithms.
The Google business was founded on its superior Page Rank search method, and the company has spent fantastic funds on R&D, allowing it to keep a competitive edge for a very long time. And the R&D continues. Curiously, just as everyone is debating RTBF, Google researchers published a paper about a new "knowledge based" approach to evaluating web pages. Surely if page ranking was less arbitrary and more transparent, a lot of the heat would come out of RTBF.
Of all the interests to balance in RTBF, Google's business objectives are actually a legitimate part of the mix. Google provides marvelous free services in exchange for data about its users which it converts into revenue, predominantly through advertising. It's a value exchange, and it need not be bad for privacy. A key component of privacy is transparency: people have a right to know what personal information about them is collected, and why. The RTBF analysis seems a little hollow without frank discussion of what everyone gets out of running a search engine.
- The European Court of Justice Right to be Forgotten ruling.
- Academic commentary compiled by Julia Powles and Rebekah Larsen from Cambridge University.
- "Knowledge-Based Trust: Estimating the Trustworthiness of Web Sources" by Xin Luna Dong et al, Google.
- My analysis of search and free speech, "Free search, a misnomer"
- My analysis of search as a Big Data process, "The rite to be forgotten".
Search engines are wondrous things. I myself use Google search umpteen times a day. I don't think I could work or play without it anymore. And yet I am a strong supporter of the contentious "Right to be Forgotten". The "RTBF" is hotly contested, and I am the first to admit it's a messy business. For one thing, it's not ideal that Google itself is required for now to adjudicate RTBF requests in Europe. But we have to accept that all of privacy is contestable. The balance of rights to privacy and rights to access information is tricky. RTBF has a long way to go, and I sense that European jurors and regulators are open and honest about this.
One of the starkest RTBF debating points is free speech. Does allowing individuals to have irrelevant, inaccurate and/or outdated search results blocked represent censorship? Is it an assault on free speech? There is surely a technical-legal question about whether the output of an algorithm represents "free speech", and as far as I can see, that question remains open. Am I the only commentator suprised by this legal blind spot? I have to say that such uncertainty destabilises a great deal of the RTBF dispute.
I am not a lawyer, but I have a strong sense that search outputs are not the sort of thing that constitutes speech. Let's bear in mind what web search is all about.
Google search is core to its multi-billion dollar advertising business. Search results are not unfiltered replicas of things found in the public domain, but rather the subtle outcome of complex Big Data processes. Google's proprietary search algorithm is famously secret, but we do know how sensitive it is to context. Most people will have noticed that search results change day by day and from place to place. But why is this?
When we enter search parameters, the result we get is actually Google's guess about what we are really looking for. Google in effect forms a hypothesis, drawing on much more than the express parameters, including our search history, browsing history, location and so on. And in all likelihood, search is influenced by the many other things Google gleans from the way we use its other properties -- gmail, maps, YouTube, hangouts and Google+ -- which are all linked now under one master data usage policy.
And here's the really clever thing about search. Google monitors how well it's predicting our real or underlying concerns. It uses a range of signals and metrics, to assess what we do with search results, and it continuously refines those processes. This is what Google really gets out of search: deep understanding of what its users are interested in, and how they are likely to respond to targeted advertising. Each search result is a little test of Google's Artificial Intelligence, which, as some like to say, is getting to know us better than we know ourselves.
As important as they are, it seems to me that search results are really just a by-product of a gigantic information business. They are nothing like free speech.
It would be naive to expect the White House Cybersecurity Summit to have been less political. President Obama and his colleagues were in their comfort zone, talking up America's recent economic turnaround, and framing their recent wins squarely within Silicon Valley where the summit took place. With a few exceptions, the first two hours was more about green energy, jobs and manufacturing than cyber security. It was a lot like a lost episode of The West Wing.
The exceptions were important. Some speakers really nailed some security issues. I especially liked the morning contributions from Intel President Renee James and MasterCard CEO Ajay Banga. James highlighted that Intel has worked for 10 years to improve "the baseline of computing security", making her one of the few speakers to get anywhere near the inherent insecurity of our cyber infrastructure. The truth is that cyberspace is built on weak foundations; the software development practices and operating systems that bear the economy today were not built for the job. For mine, the Summit was too much about military/intelligence themed information sharing, and not enough about why our systems are so precarious. I know it's a dry subject but if they're serious about security, policy makers really have to engage with software quality and reliability, instead of thrilling to kids learning to code. Software development practices are to blame for many of our problems; more on software failures here.
Ajay Banga was one of several speakers to urge the end of passwords. He summed up the authentication problem very nicely: "Stop making us remember things in order to prove who we are". He touched on MasterCard's exploration of continuous authentication bracelets and biometrics (more news of which coincidentally came out today). It's important however that policy makers' understanding of digital infrastructure resilience, cybercrime and cyber terrorism isn't skewed by everyone's favourite security topic - customer authentication. Yes, it's in need of repair, yet authentication is not to blame for the vast majority of breaches. Mom and Pop struggle with passwords and they deserve better, but the vast majority of stolen personal data is lifted by organised criminals en masse from poorly secured back-end databases. Replacing customer passwords or giving everyone biometrics is not going to solve the breach epidemic.
Banga also indicated that the Information Highway should be more like road infrastructure. He highlighted that national routes are regulated, drivers are licensed, there are rules of the road, standardised signs, and enforcement. All these infrastructure arrangements leave plenty of room for innovation in car design, but it's accepted that "all cars have four wheels".
Tim Cook was then the warm-up act before Obama. Many on Twitter unkindly branded Cook's speech as an ad for Apple, paid for by the White House, but I'll accentuate the positives. Cook continues to campaign against business models that monetize personal data. He repeated his promise made after the ApplePay launch that they will not exploit the data they have on their customers. He put privacy before security in everything he said.
Cook painted a vision where digital wallets hold your passport, driver license and other personal documents, under the user's sole control, and without trading security for convenience. I trust that he's got the mobile phone Secure Element in mind; until we can sort out cybersecurity at large, I can't support the counter trend towards cloud-based wallets. The world's strongest banks still can't guarantee to keep credit card numbers safe, so we're hardly ready to put our entire identities in the cloud.
In his speech, President Obama reiterated his recent legislative agenda for information sharing, uniform breach notification, student digital privacy, and a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. He stressed the need for private-public partnership and cybersecurity responsibility to be shared between government and business. He reiterated the new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center. And as flagged just before the summit, the president signed an Executive Order that will establish cyber threat information sharing "hubs" and standards to foster sharing while protecting privacy.
Obama told the audience that cybersecurity "is not an ideological issue". Of course that message was actually for Congress which is deliberating over his cyber legislation. But let's take a moment to think about how ideology really does permeate this arena. Three quasi-religious disputes come to mind immediately:
- Free speech trumps privacy. The ideals of free speech have been interpreted in the US in such a way that makes broad-based privacy law intractable. The US is one of only two major nations now without a general data protection statute (the other is China). It seems this impasse is rarely questioned anymore by either side of the privacy debate, but perhaps the scope of the First Amendment has been allowed to creep out too far, for now free speech rights are in effect being granted even to computers. Look at the controversy over the "Right to be Forgotten" (RTBF), where Google is being asked to remove certain personal search results if they are irrelevant, old and inaccurate. Jimmy Wales claims this requirement harms "our most fundamental rights of expression and privacy". But we're not talking about speech here, or even historical records, but rather the output of a computer algorithm, and a secret algorithm at that, operated in the service of an advertising business. The vociferous attacks on RTBF are very ideological indeed.
- "Innovation" trumps privacy. It's become an unexamined mantra that digital businesses require unfettered access to information. I don't dispute that some of the world's richest ever men, and some of the world's most powerful ever corporations have relied upon the raw data that exudes from the Internet. It's just like the riches uncovered by the black gold rush on the 1800s. But it's an ideological jump to extrapolate that all cyber innovation or digital entrepreneurship must continue the same way. Rampant data mining is laying waste to consumer confidence and trust in the Internet. Some reasonable degree of consumer rights regulation seems inevitable, and just, if we are to avert a digital Tragedy of the Commons.
- National Security trumps privacy. I am a rare privacy advocate who actually agrees that the privacy-security equilibrium needs to be adjusted. I believe the world has changed since some of our foundational values were codified, and civil liberties are just one desirable property of a very complicated social system. However, I call out one dimensional ideology when national security enthusiasts assert that privacy has to take a back seat. There are ways to explore a measured re-calibration of privacy, to maintain proportionality, respect and trust.
President Obama described the modern technological world as a "magnificent cathedral" and he made an appeal to "values embedded in the architecture of the system". We should look critically at whether the values of entrepreneurship, innovation and competitiveness embedded in the way digital business is done in America could be adjusted a little, to help restore the self-control and confidence that consumers keep telling us is evaporating online.
If the digital economy is really the economy then it's high time we moved beyond hoping that we can simply train users to be safe online. Is the real economy only for heros who can protect themselves in the jungle, writing their own code. As if they're carrying their own guns? Or do we as a community build structures and standards and insist on technologies that work for all?
For most people, the World Wide Web experience still a lot like watching cartoons on TV. The human-machine interface is almost the same. The images and actions are just as synthetic; crucially, nothing on a web browser is real. Almost anything goes -- just as the Roadrunner defies gravity in besting Coyote, there are no laws of physics that temper the way one bit of multimedia leads to the next. Yes, there is a modicum of user feedback in the way we direct some of the action when browsing and e-shopping, but it's quite illusory; for the most part all we're really doing is flicking channels across a billion pages.
It's the suspension of disbelief when browsing that lies at the heart of many of the safety problems we're now seeing. Inevitably we lose our bearings in the totally synthetic World Wide Web. We don't even realise it, we're taken in by a virtual reality, and we become captive to social engineering.
But I don't think it's possible to tackle online safety by merely countering users' credulity. Education is not the silver bullet, because the Internet is really so technologically complex and abstract that it lies beyond the comprehension of most lay people.
Using the Internet 'safely' today requires deep technical skills, comparable to the level of expertise needed to operate an automobile circa 1900. Back then you needed to be able to do all your own mechanics [roughly akin to the mysteries of maintaining anti-virus software], look after the engine [i.e. configure the operating system and firewall], navigate the chaotic emerging road network [there's yet no trusted directory for the Internet, nor any road rules], and even figure out how to fuel the contraption [consumer IT supply chains is about as primitive as the gasoline industry was 100 years ago]. The analogy with the early car industry becomes especially sharp for me when I hear utopian open source proponents argue that writing ones own software is the best way to be safe online.
The Internet is so critical (I'd have thought this was needless to say) that we need ways of working online that don't require us to all be DIY experts.
I wrote a first draft of this blog six years ago, and at that time I called for patience in building digital literacy and sophistication. "It took decades for safe car and road technologies to evolve, and the Internet is still really in its infancy" I said in 2009. But I'm less relaxed about his now, on the brink of the Internet of Things. It's great that the policy makers like the US FTC are calling on connected device makers to build in security and privacy, but I suspect the Internet of Things will require the same degree of activist oversight and regulation as does the auto industry, for the sake of public order and the economy. Do we have the appetite to temper breakneck innovation with safety rules?
This is an updated version of arguments made in Lockstep's submission to the 2009 Cyber Crime Inquiry by the Australian federal government.
In stark contrast to other fields, cyber safety policy is almost exclusively preoccupied with user education. It's really an obsession. Governments and industry groups churn out volumes of well-meaning and technically reasonable security advice, but for the average user, this material is overwhelming. There is a subtle implication that security is for experts, and that the Internet isn't safe unless you go to extremes. Moreover, even if consumers do their very best online, their personal details can still be taken over in massive criminal raids on databases that hardly anyone even know exist.
Too much onus is put on regular users protecting themselves online, and this blinds us to potential answers to cybercrime. In other walks of life, we accept a balanced approach to safety, and governments are less reluctant to impose standards than they are on the Internet. Road safety for instance rests evenly on enforceable road rules, car technology innovation, certified automotive products, mandatory quality standards, traffic management systems, and driver training and licensing. Education alone would be nearly worthless.
Around cybercrime we have a bizarre allergy to technology. We often hear that 'Preventing data breaches not a technology issue' which may be politically correct but it's faintly ridiculous. Nobody would ever say that preventing car crashes is 'not a technology issue'.
Credit card fraud and ID theft in general are in dire need of concerted technological responses. Consider that our Card Not Present (CNP) payments processing arrangements were developed many years ago for mail orders and telephone orders. It was perfectly natural to co-opt the same processes when the Internet arose, since it seemed simply to be just another communications medium. But the Internet turned out to be more than an extra channel: it connects everyone to everything, around the clock.
The Internet has given criminals x-ray vision into peoples' banking details, and perfect digital disguises with which to defraud online merchants. There are opportunities for crime now that are both quantitatively and qualitatively radically different from what went before. In particular, because identity data is available by the terabyte and digital systems cannot tell copies from originals, identity takeover is child's play.
You don't even need to have ever shopped online to run foul of CNP fraud. Most stolen credit card numbers are obtained en masse by criminals breaking into obscure backend databases. These attacks go on behind the scenes, out of sight of even the most careful online customers.
So the standard cyber security advice misses the point. Consumers are told earnestly to look out for the "HTTPS" padlock that purportedly marks a site as secure, to have a firewall, to keep their PCs "patched" and their anti-virus up to date, to only shop online at reputable merchants, and to avoid suspicious looking sites (as if cyber criminals aren't sufficiently organised to replicate legitimate sites in their entirety). But none of this advice touches on the problem of coordinated massive heists of identity data.
Merchants are on the hook for unwieldy and increasingly futile security overheads. When a business wishes to accept credit card payments, it's straightforward in the real world to install a piece of bank-approved terminal equipment. But to process credit cards online, shopkeepers have to sign up to onerous PCI-DSS requirements that in effect require even small business owners to become IT security specialists. But to what end? No audit regime will ever stop organised crime. To stem identity theft, we need to make stolen IDs less valuable.
All this points to urgent public policy matters for governments and banks. It is not enough to put the onus on individuals to guard against ad hoc attacks on their credit cards. Systemic changes and technological innovation are needed to render stolen personal data useless to thieves. It's not that the whole payments processing system is broken; rather, it is vulnerable at just one point where stolen digital identities can be abused.
Digital identities are the keys to our personal kingdoms. As such they really need to be treated as seriously as car keys, which have become very high tech indeed. Modern car keys cannot be duplicated at a suburban locksmith. It's possible you've come across office and filing cabinet keys that carry government security certifications. And we never use the same keys for our homes and offices; we wouldn't even consider it (which points to the basic weirdness in Single Sign On and identity federation).
In stark contrast to car keys, almost no attention is paid to the pedigree of digital identities. Technology neutrality has bred a bewildering array of ad hoc authentication methods, including SMS messages, one time password generators, password calculators, grid cards and picture passwords; at the same time we've done nothing at all to inhibit the re-use of stolen IDs.
It's high time government and industry got working together on a uniform and universal set of smart identity tools to properly protect consumers online.
Stay tuned for more of my thoughts on identity safety, inspired by recent news that health identifiers may be back on the table in the gigantic U.S. e-health system. The security and privacy issues are large but the cyber safety technology is at hand!
Constellation Research analysts are wrapping up a very busy 2014 with a series of "State of the State" reports. For my part I've looked at the state of privacy, which I feel is entering its adolescent stage.
Here's a summary.
1. Consumers have not given up privacy - they've been tricked out of it.
The impression is easily formed that people just don’t care about privacy anymore, but in fact people are increasingly frustrated with privacy invasions. They’re tired of social networks mining users’ personal lives; they are dismayed that video game developers can raid a phone’s contact lists with impunity; they are shocked by the deviousness of Target analyzing women’s shopping histories to detect pregnant customers; and they are revolted by the way magnates help themselves to operational data like Uber’s passenger movements for fun or allegedly for harassment – just because they can.
2. Private sector surveillance is overshadowed by government intrusion, but is arguably just as bad.
Edward Snowden’s revelations of a massive military-industrial surveillance effort were of course shocking, but they should not steal all the privacy limelight. In parallel with and well ahead of government spy programs, the big OSNs and search engine companies have been gathering breathtaking amounts of data, all in the interests of targeted advertising. These data stores have come to the attention of the FBI and CIA who must be delighted that someone else has done so much of their spying for them. These businesses boast that they know us better than we know ourselves. That’s chilling. We need to break through into a post-Snowden world.
3. The U.S. is the Canary Islands of privacy.
The United States remains the only major economy without broad-based information privacy laws. There are almost no restraints on what American businesses may do with personal information they collect from their customers, or synthesize from their operations. In the rest of the world, most organizations must restrict their collection of data, limit the repurposing of data, and disclose their data handling practices in full. Individuals may want to move closer to European-style privacy protection, while many corporations prefer the freedom they have in America to hang on to any data they like while they figure out how to make money out of it. Digital companies like to call this “innovation” and grandiose claims are made about its criticality for the American economy, but many consumers would prefer the sort of innovation that respects their privacy while delivering value-for-data.
4. Privacy is more about politics than technology.
Privacy can be seen as a power play between individual rights and the interests of governments and businesses. Most of us actually want businesses to know quite a lot about us, but we expect them to respect what they know and to be restrained in how they use it. Privacy is less about what organizations do with information than what they choose not to do with it. Hence, privacy cannot be a technology issue. It is not about keeping things secret but rather, keeping them close. Privacy is actually the protection we need when things are not secret.
5. Land grab for “public” data accelerates.
6. Data literacy will be key to digital safety.
Computer literacy is one thing, but data literacy is different and less tangible. We have strong privacy intuitions that have evolved over centuries but in cyberspace we lose our bearings. We don’t have the familiar social cues when we go online, so now we need to develop new ones. And we need to build up a common understanding of how data flows in the digital economy. Today we train kids in financial literacy to engender a first-hand sense of how commerce works; data literacy may become even more important as a life skill. It's more than being able to work an operating system, a device and umpteen apps. It means having meaningful mental models of what goes on in computers. Without understanding this, we can’t construct effective privacy policies or privacy labeling.
7. Privacy will get worse before it gets better.
Privacy is messy, even where data protection rules are well entrenched. Consider the controversial Right To Be Forgotten in Europe, which requires search engine operators to provide a mechanism for individuals to request removal of old, inaccurate and harmful reports from results. The new rule has been derived from existing privacy principles, which treat the results of search algorithms as a form of synthesis rather than a purely objective account of history, and therefore hold the search companies partly responsible for the offense their processes might produce. Yet, there are plenty of unintended consequences, and collisions with other jurisprudence. The sometimes urgent development of new protections for old civil rights is never plain sailing.
My report "Privacy Enters Adolescence" can be downloaded here. It expands on the points above, and sets out recommendations for improving awareness of how Personal Data flows in the digital economy, negotiating better deals in the data-for-value bargain, the conduct of Privacy Impact Assessments, and developing a "Privacy Bill of Rights".
An Engadget report today, "Hangouts eavesdrops on your chats to offer 'smart suggestions'" describes a new "spy/valet" feature being added to Google's popular video chat tool.
- "Google's Hangouts is gaining a handy, but slightly creepy new feature today. The popular chat app will now act as a digital spy-slash-valet by eavesdropping on your conversations to offer 'smart suggestions.' For instance, if a pal asks 'where are you?' it'll immediately prompt you to share your location, then open a map so you can pin it precisely."
It's sad that this sort of thing still gets meekly labeled as "creepy". The privacy implications are serious and pretty easy to see.
Google is evidently processing the text of Hangouts as they fly through their system, extracting linguistic cues, interpreting what's being said using Artificial Intelligence, extracting new meaning and insights, and offering suggestions.
We need some clarification about whether any covert tests of this technology have been undertaken during the R&D phase. A company obviously doesn't launch a new product like this without a lot of research, feasibility testing, prototyping and testing. Serious work on 'smart suggestions' would not start without first testing how it works in real life. So I wonder if any of this evaluation was done covertly on live data? Are Google researchers routinely eavesdropping on hangouts to develop the 'smart suggestions' technology?
Many people have said to me I'm jumping the gun, and that Google would probably test the new Hangouts feature on its own employees. Perhaps, but given that scanning gmails is situation normal for Google, and they have a "privacy" culture that joins up all their business units so that data may be re-purposed almsot without limit, I feel sure that running AI algorithms on text without telling people would be par for the course.
In development and in operation, we need to know what steps are taken to protect the privacy of hangout data. What personally identifiable data and metadata is retained for other purposes? Who inside Google is granted access to the data and especially the synthtised insights? How long does any secondary usage persist for? Are particularly sensitive matters (like health data, financial details, corporate intellectual property etc.) filtered out?
This is well beyond "creepy". Hangouts and similar video chat are certainly wonderdful technologies. We're using them routinely for teaching, education, video conferencing, collaboration and consultation. The tools may become entrenched in corporate meetings, telecommuting, healthcare and the professions. But if I am talking with my doctor, or discussing patents with my legal team, or having a clandestine chat with a lover, I clearly do not want any unsolicited contributions from the service provider. More fundamentally, I want assurance that no machine is ever tapping into these sorts of communications, running AI algorithms, and creating new insights. If I'm wrong about covert testing on live data, then Google could do what Apple did and publish an Open Letter clarifying their data usage practices and strategies.
Come to think of it, if Google is running natural language processing algorithms over the Hangouts stream, might they be augmenting their gmail scanning the same way? Their business model is to extract insights about users from any data they get their hands on. Until now it's been a crude business of picking out keywords and using them to profile users' interests and feed targeted advertising. But what if they could get deeper information about us through AI? Is there any sign from their historical business practices that Google would not do this? And what if they can extract sensitive information like mental health indications? Even with good intent and transarency, predicting healthcare from social media is highly problematic as shown by the "Samaritans Radar" experience.
Artificial Intelligence is one of the new frontiers. Hot on the heels of the successes of IBM Watson, we're seeing Natural Language Processing and analytics rapidly penetrate business and now consumer applications. Commentators are alternately telling us that AI will end humanity, and not to worry about it. For now, I call on people to simply think clearly through the implications, such as for privacy. If AI programs are clever enough to draw deep insights about us from what we say, then the "datapreneurs" in charge of those algorithms need to remember they are just as accountable for privacy as if they have asked us reveal all by filling out a questionnaire.
A letter to the editor of The Saturday Paper, published Nov 15, 2014.
In his otherwise fresh and sympathetic “Web of abuse” (November 8-14), Martin McKenzie-Murray unfortunately concludes by focusing on the ability of victims of digital hate to “[rationally] assess their threat level”. More’s the point, symbolic violence is still violent. The threat of sexual assault by men against women is inherently terrifying and damaging, whether it is carried out or not. Any attenuation of the threat of rape dehumanises all of us.
There’s a terrible double standard among cyber-libertarians. When good things happen online – such as the Arab Spring, WikiLeaks, social networking and free education – they call the internet a transformative force for good. Yet they can play down digital hate crimes as “not real”, and disown their all-powerful internet as just another communications medium.
Stephen Wilson, Five Dock, NSW.